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I. INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a right to jury trial in most civil cases in federal courts. It
provides that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
1
common law.

This language—the use of the word “preserved” and the reference to
the common law—invokes history, but the precise role of history has
been the subject of considerable controversy and inconsistency over
the last two centuries. Interpreting the Seventh Amendment, the
courts have made two important distinctions: that between law and
equity on the one hand, and that between law and fact on the other.
The historical right to a civil jury in England existed for cases brought
in common law courts, as opposed to courts of equity, and the right
2
extended to questions of fact, not questions of law.
The Court has been most consistent in honoring historical forms
when distinguishing between law and equity, though it has not been
entirely faithful to history even there. But when it comes to
distinguishing between law and fact, the record is much more
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difficult to interpret. This distinction has long been a difficult one,
possibly because the kinds of questions that come up in trials do not
divide neatly into two categories. There are pure questions of law,
pure questions of fact, mixed questions of law and fact, ultimate facts,
4
and perhaps others.
It has been suggested that the law/fact
distinction is nothing but a mask for a policy decision about which
5
questions should be given to the judge and which to the jury. This
distinction, however, does have Constitutional significance.
It
deserves another look, at least in part, because the Supreme Court
has recently invoked it in a context that raises questions about the
entire history of that distinction in Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
In 1996, the Court decided Markman v. Westview Instruments,
6
Inc., a patent case in which the issue was how one should interpret a
7
patent claim. The Court noted that previous decisions had relied on
distinctions between law and fact or between substance and
8
procedure to determine what issues go to the jury, but asserted that
9
the “sounder course” was to use the “historical method.” Looking to
eighteenth century English cases, the Court found that, while the
cases were ambiguous, judges rather than juries generally interpreted
patent specifications—the rough equivalent of the modern claim—
and that, in any event, there was an established rule that judges, not

3

Much has been written on the law/fact distinction. See, e.g., WILLIAM FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 216-48 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1994) (1875); LEON
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 268-79 (1930); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF NEW TRIALS
(1866); JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRIES BY A JURY (1873); SIR
JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 15-18 (1920); JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 183-262 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969)
(1898); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111
(1924); Frederick J. de Slovere, The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1933); Jabez Fox, Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545
(1899); Frederick Green, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 15 HARV. L. REV. 271
(1901); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1922); Fleming
James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949); J.
Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1985);
Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1991);
Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867
(1966); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact, or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1986).
4
For a discussion of some of these categories, see SWARD, supra note 2, at 272-73.
5
See Fox, supra note 3, at 551; see also Isaacs, supra note 3, at 4; Weiner, supra
note 3, at 1868.
6
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
7
See id. at 373-74. A claim is the part of the patent that describes the invention.
8
See id. at 378.
9
Id.
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juries, interpreted written documents. Further, finding no reason in
“existing precedent,” in “the relative interpretive skills of judges and
juries,” or in the “statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the
11
allocation,” the Court held that there is no right to have a jury
12
interpret the claim in a patent.
This case could be confined to its facts, of course, and apply only
to the interpretation of claims in patents, but its language was
broader than that. If we are now to look to history in defining fact
and law, it is worth examining how that history might affect current
practices. That examination, it turns out, is quite telling. Over the
nation’s history, the Court has approved a variety of tests and
procedural devices that, collectively, have changed our definition of
fact and law. Specifically, some issues that quite clearly would have
been classified as “fact” and given to juries in eighteenth century
England are now classified as “law” and given to the judge to decide.
In this article, I will trace that transformation. The earliest and most
important development was the rejection of the so-called “scintilla”
test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of the
“reasonable jury” test. The cases show that what is “reasonable” is
often in the eyes of the beholder, meaning that the new test gives
judges more power. Court approval of three new procedural devices
whose contours were refined in the twentieth century—summary
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict—also gave judges more power. The latter two are now
13
collectively called judgment as a matter of law, but I will use the
older terms in this article to emphasize their separate development.
In Part II of this article I will present a brief description of the
history and structure of the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees
the right to a jury trial in certain civil cases. Part III then discusses
how law and fact have been defined in English and American legal
history, using the development of the reasonable jury test, directed
verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and summary
judgment as anchors. This discussion shows that, for the most part,
courts have moved toward defining as “law” some matters that would
have been called “fact” at the time the Seventh Amendment was
10

See id. at 380-82.
Id. at 384.
12
517 U.S. at 391.
13
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The
purpose of this change in terminology was to underline the fact that a directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were judged by the same test as
summary judgment. Id. The summary judgment rule also uses the term “judgment
as a matter of law.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
11
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ratified. The effect of this is that judges now decide some issues that
juries would have decided at the time of the Seventh Amendment’s
ratification. In Part IV, I complete the historical development by
discussing Markman in more detail and speculating on its import. I
conclude that if the Court is serious about using history to define law
and fact, it will have to revisit the constitutionality of the reasonable
jury test, the directed verdict, the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and the summary judgment.
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
Before we can understand the effect Markman might have on the
law/fact distinction, it is important to understand how history has
been used in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. In this section I
will first describe briefly the English and American origins of the
Seventh Amendment. I then turn to a brief description of how
history has been used in the analysis of the two distinctions that the
Seventh Amendment draws: that between law and equity, and that
between law and fact.
A. Origins
1. The English Origins
The civil jury is an English institution, imported to the American
14
colonies by English immigrants. The English jury dates to shortly
after the Norman Conquest of 1066, and is generally thought to be a
15
Originally, the jury was an inquisitorial device,
Norman import.
whereby citizens from the neighborhood where the dispute arose
16
were summoned to tell the court what happened. If the summoned
jurors did not know what had happened they were required to make
17
inquiries and then swear in court as to the facts.
Over several
centuries, the jury evolved to its present form, in which jurors are
expected to know nothing about the matter except what they hear in
14

A more detailed history of the civil jury appears in SWARD, supra note 2, at ch.
2. Perhaps the best general history of the jury is found in THAYER, supra note 3. For
additional sources, see LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956); FORSYTH, supra
note 3; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 135-46 (1903); THEODORE
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 106-38 (1956); 1 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 138-46 (1898).
15
See JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 119-20 (1960); see also FORSYTH,
supra note 3, at 45-77; PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 107-09; R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 73-79 (1988).
16
See THAYER, supra note 3, at 54
17
See id.
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court. Trials in substantially modern form apparently occurred by
19
the end of the fifteenth century, but jurors were permitted to base
20
By the
their decisions on personal knowledge as late as 1670.
middle of the eighteenth century, however, jurors were forbidden to
21
base their decisions on personal knowledge.
At the time of the American Revolution, there were two
significant limits on the scope of the English civil jury’s authority.
First, the jury was confined to the common law courts and did not
operate at all in courts of equity. Courts of equity developed because
the rigid rules and procedures of the common law courts sometimes
22
prevented those courts from doing justice. While the jurisdiction of
courts of equity was limited by the doctrine that equity could act only
23
if the remedy in the common law courts was inadequate, the courts
of equity still had substantial authority, including the power to enjoin
24
common law proceedings under some circumstances. The primary
25
remedy in common law courts was money damages.
Courts of
equity handled nearly everything else, including injunctions,
18

See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judges of Proofs: The
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201 (1988).
19
See PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 129-30.
20
See Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670); see also Mitnick,
supra note 18, at 203-07. Most of the English cases cited in this article were reported
initially by individual reporters and collected in reports bearing their names. These
so-called nominal reports were collected in the English Reports. I give both citations
in this article, but I have consulted only the English Reports.
21
See Mitnick, supra note 18, at 207 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 374-75 (1768)). The case that established
this was apparently Dormer v. Parkhurst, Andr. 315, 95 Eng. Rep. 414 (K.B. 1738). See
Mitnick, supra note 18, at 226.
22
See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 1-28 (2d ed. 1937); see also 1
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 16-23 (Spencer W.
Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941). The jury also did not operate in admiralty courts.
23
See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES – EQUITY – RESTITUTION
§ 2.1(1) (2d ed. 1993).
24
A court of equity could enjoin a common law proceeding if the court of equity
already had jurisdiction over the matter. See SWARD, supra note 2, at 159. This
prevented multiple suits on the same matter. See id. A court of equity could also
enjoin a person from instituting multiple common law proceedings on the same
matter, or from threatening to do so. See id. A court of equity acted to prevent
irreparable harm, and it was thought that having to litigate multiple suits arising out
of the same matter would cause irreparable harm. See id. at 159-60.
25
See JOHN E. CRIBBET, JUDICIAL REMEDIES 36 (Erwin N. Griswold ed., 1954).
Common law courts could also order the recovery of real and personal property
through such claims as ejectment and replevin. See 1 POMEROY, supra note 22, at
§109. They also handled a variety of extraordinary writs, such as the writ of habeas
corpus. For discussions of the common law extraordinary writs, see 2 CHESTER J.
ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (1987); FORREST G. FERRIS &
FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1926).
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accountings, trusts, reformation of contracts, and some forms of
26
restitution.
The second major limitation on English civil juries was that they
could decide questions of fact, but not questions of law. This
limitation was apparently well-established by the seventeenth century,
when Lord Coke said unequivocally that judges are to decide
27
questions of law, and juries are to decide questions of fact. There
were problems with this neat maxim, however. First, some forms of
pleading allowed juries to make de facto determinations of law. For
example, while English common law pleading rules historically
required the parties to continue pleading until they had reduced the
28
matter to a single issue of fact or law, the general issue plea allowed
a party to contest the entire opposing pleading without specifying the
29
part of the pleading with which she took issue. This sometimes
meant that a jury could not help but make a determination of law.
30
Second, it was not always easy to distinguish fact from law. This
difficulty manifested itself in several ways. Judges and juries often
seemed to share decision-making on some issues, with juries deciding
31
what the facts were and judges then applying the law to those facts.
For example, in a common law libel action, the jury would decide
whether the alleged libel had been published and the import of the
words used, but the judge would make a determination of law as to
32
whether the jury’s fact-finding warranted a judgment of libel.
Disputes sometimes arose between judge and jury when the jury’s
fact-finding conflicted with the judge’s views, but English judges
could guide the jury by instructing it as to the law and by
26

Pomeroy’s treatise is five volumes, which attests to the scope and complexity
that equity eventually acquired. See supra note 22.
27
See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 135 n.7; see also THAYER, supra note 3, at
185, 187. See generally BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: ENGLAND 1550-1720
(2000) (describing how the concept of “fact” arose out of developments in English
law); Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind,
18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267 (1974) (discussing the role of the special verdict in the
development of the law/fact distinction); S.F.C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal
Development, 17 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1967) (describing the effect of distinguishing
between law and fact on the development of legal principles).
28
See THAYER, supra note 3; MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF
TRESPASS FROM THE KING’S COURTS, 1307-99, at x-xx (Selden Society vol. 100, 1985).
29
See J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 84 (3d ed. 1990); see
also David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
669 (1989).
30
See supra note 3.
31
See, e.g., Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 205-06, 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 508-09 (N.P.
1793); FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 221, 223-35; THAYER, supra note 3, at 185-88.
32
See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 223-35.
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33

commenting on the evidence.
Although juries could defy the
judge’s guidance and find the facts differently from the judge’s
suggestions, the trial judge had the power to order a new trial if he
34
thought the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
A
further complication is that juries were usually asked to apply the law
35
to the facts even though that was not their job.
A party could
remove the law-applying task from the jury through procedural
36
devices such as the demurrer to the evidence.
Another manifestation of the difficulty in classifying issues as fact
or law is reflected in some rather arbitrary historical characterizations
37
of adjudicatory tasks. For example, the interpretation of written
documents was characterized as a question of law for the judge,
apparently on the theory that the words on a page have immutable
38
legal meaning. In modern practice, we look to the intent of the
parties behind the writing’s language and consider intent a question
33

See id. at 224-25.
See id. at 157-58. Many English common law trials were actually held before
more than one judge. See DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND, 17271875, at 7-8, 23 (1982); see also S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 72 (2d ed. 1981); Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 508; Steel v. Houghton, 1 H.
Bl. 52, 52-63, 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33-39 (C.P. 1788); Harris v. Porter, Car. 1, 1-2, 124
Eng. Rep. 788, 788-89 (C.P. 1688). For discussion of how English courts were
organized, see RONALD WALKER & RICHARD WARD, WALKER & WALKER’S ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 131-39 (7th ed. 1994). While the trial court could order a new trial for
alleged factual error, the appellate courts had no such power. See ROSCOE POUND,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 57 (1941). Appellate courts could order a new
trial only for legal error. See id. There was no provision for either trial or appellate
courts to enter judgments contrary to the jury’s fact-finding. There is some authority
stating that appellate courts could “recall” judgments for factual errors, but such
factual errors are narrowly defined and must appear on the face of the record. See id.
Factual errors subject to this procedure include such matters as the plaintiff’s being
underage, the plaintiff’s being a married woman, or the death of the plaintiff prior
to the verdict. See 2 MATTHEW BACON, NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 217 (1736).
Appellate courts could not recall verdicts that the jury returned on disputed
questions of fact. See id.
35
See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 509. See generally Green, supra note 3 (describing
the difficulty of separating questions of law from questions of fact).
36
See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 509; see also Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg.
Co., 142 U.S. 128, 134 (1891) (discussing English practice); Hopkins v. Nashville, C
& St. L. Ry., 34 S.W. 1029 (Tenn. 1896) (same). A demurrer to the evidence is
similar to the modern directed verdict.
37
There are many examples of apparently arbitrary classifications of issues of fact
or law. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 4-5. Isaacs was looking primarily at American cases
around the turn of the twentieth century. See id.
38
See, e.g., Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T.R. 173, 180-82, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, 104041 (K.B. 1786); Clench v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (1603); Vicary v.
Farthing, Cro. Eliz. 411, 78 Eng. Rep. 653 (1595); THAYER, supra note 3, at 205-06.
One reason for this rule is that many jurors could not read. See Macferson v. Thoytes,
Peake 29, 170 Eng. Rep. 67 (N.P. 1790).
34
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of fact, perhaps reflecting less confidence in the determinacy of
39
words.
Mixed questions of law and fact also made the law/fact
distinction difficult because there were only two ways to allocate
40
authority: to the judge or to the jury. Mixed questions often appear
to be questions of fact, but have some legal content. For example,
the question whether an alleged tortfeasor’s conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances is generally considered to be a question of
41
fact for the jury.
The decision, however, can help define the
contours of reasonableness, and thus provide guidance to others.
42
This gives the determination the look of law.
At common law there were a number of procedural devices used
to police the judge/jury allocation and these devices are important
43
for the analysis that follows. The two most important are demurrer
to the evidence and case reserved. Demurrer to the evidence allowed
a party to obtain a decision on the law of the case by admitting the
44
facts and inferences shown by her opponent’s evidence. It required
the party to forego presenting any evidence of her own, so that if she
45
lost the demurrer to the evidence, she lost the case. Case reserved
allowed the court to give the case to the jury while reserving a
decision on a question of law that arose during the trial. It was
possible for the court to decide the question of law in a way that
46
conflicted with the jury’s decision, but the legal decision prevailed.

39

See, e.g., Rankin v. Fid. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 189 U.S. 242, 252-54 (1903);
Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966); 5 MARGARET N.
KNIFFEN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.30 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998). On
the indeterminacy of words, see generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1958); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 238-39 (1995); Peter C.
Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2514-18 (1992).
40
See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 8-10; see also Bohlen, supra note 3; Green, supra
note 3.
41
See, e.g., Lewis v. Knowlton, 688 A.2d 912, 914 (Me. 1997); Johnson v. A.M.C.,
225 N.W.2d 57, 65 (N.D. 1974); J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Brockman, 135 S.W.2d 698,
699 (Tex. 1940); Bohlen, supra note 3, at 115.
42
See generally Bohlen, supra note 3 (discussing mixed questions of law and fact);
Green, supra note 3 (same).
43
For discussions of these various devices, see Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); ROBERT WYNESS
MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 297-309
(1952).
44
See Henderson, supra note 43, at 304-05; see also Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 399-400 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
45
For discussions of the demurrer to the evidence, see THAYER, supra note 3, at
234-39; Henderson, supra note 43, at 304-05.
46
For discussions of the case reserved, see Henderson, supra note 43, at 305-07.
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Other devices, bearing modern names but differing substantially
from the modern form, were directed verdict and judgment
47
notwithstanding the verdict.
The directed verdict was simply an
instruction to the jury, which the jury could ignore. The judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was a device used by the plaintiff to
challenge the sufficiency of the defendant’s pleading after the
48
verdict.
By 1791, when the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution was ratified, the rules governing the allocation of
decision-making authority between judges and juries in England had
grown quite complex. On the surface, two primary allocational rules
were still in place—juries functioned only in common law courts and
they decided only questions of fact, while judges decided everything
else. The difficulty of fitting complicated, multi-faceted questions
into just two categories, fact and law, gave rise to some strange and
over-lapping rules. We still struggle with this problem of allocation
today, and English history continues to inform the resolution of this
problem.
2. American Origins
The American colonies adapted many English practices when
they set up their governments, including the practice of using juries
in both civil and criminal cases. This does not mean that jury
practice in the various colonies was identical to that of England; nor
does it mean that such practice was uniform among the colonies.
49
There were many variations in jury practice, both large and small.
One important difference between English and colonial juries was
that, in many of the colonies, juries had the power to decide law as
50
well as fact. On the other hand, the colonies generally maintained
the distinction between law and equity, though many maintained the
47

See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts,
44 MINN. L. REV. 903, 910 (1971); see also Henderson, supra note 43, at 302-04.
48
See MILLAR, supra note 43, at 324. The judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was the reverse of the motion in arrest of judgment, whereby the defendant could
challenge a pleading error by the plaintiff after the verdict. See id.; see also HERBERT
BROOM, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW 208 (4th ed. 1873).
49
See generally Henderson, supra note 43, at 289 (discussing a variation in jury
practice).
50
See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 3-29
(1975); Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); see also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 705-06 n.183 (1973); Stephen
C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 103-06;
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 172
(1964).
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distinction through separate procedures rather than separate courts.
In addition, limitations on appellate review of jury verdicts were at
52
least as strong in the colonies as in England.
Colonial practices reflect the fact that the jury was one of the
53
most important institutions in the struggle for independence.
Colonial juries regularly refused to enforce British laws that the
colonists viewed as oppressive, whether the laws were civil or
54
criminal.
Indeed, the British tried vigorously to evade colonial
juries by providing that sensitive matters be tried in courts of equity
55
or admiralty, where the jury did not operate.
Depriving the
colonists of trial by jury was one of the grievances set forth against the
56
king in the Declaration of Independence.
Nevertheless, in 1787, when the Constitutional Convention
proposed a new Constitution to the American people to replace the
57
dysfunctional Articles of Confederation, the proposed Constitution
contained no reference to civil juries, though it did provide for a
58
right to jury trial in criminal cases. Furthermore, Article III of the
Constitution provided that the Supreme Court had appellate
59
jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact,” a power that could effectively
nullify a jury verdict. Some people interpreted these provisions as
meaning that the civil jury was abolished, and used that alleged

51

See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 8 n.14, 493 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971). The
colonies had trouble deciding how to incorporate equitable principles, and so took
many approaches, including separate courts, separate procedures, and legislative
determinations of claims in equity. See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the
United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
52
See id. at 19-35.
53
See NELSON, supra note 50; Wolfram, supra note 50, at 653-56.
54
See, e.g., VINCENT BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (1957) (discussing
criminal libel trial of newspaper editor); NELSON, supra note 50, at 31 (discussing
nullification of the Navigation Act); Wolfram, supra note 50, at 703-08.
55
See GOEBEL, supra note 51, at 85-87.
56
See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 1 (American State Papers 1952) (1776).
57
For general histories of the Constitutional Convention and the origins of the
Constitution, see THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, WHICH FRAME
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON, A
DELEGATE FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds.,
1920); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913); CLINTON LAWRENCE ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966).
58
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3 (providing for a right to jury trial in criminal
cases).
59
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2 (describing the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court). For a discussion of the powers of courts in England to alter jury verdicts, see
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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abolition to rouse opposition to the Constitution.
When the
Constitution was ratified in 1789, it was understood that the First
Congress would propose a Bill of Rights in the form of amendments
61
to the Constitution, and Congress wasted no time in doing so. The
62
Seventh Amendment contains the guarantee of a right to a civil jury.
The Seventh Amendment was problematic for the drafters of the
Bill of Rights because of the considerable variation in jury practices
that existed among the states. The Amendment’s language is
intentionally vague, but it invokes both the law/equity distinction and
the law/fact distinction. It specifically refers to the common law (not
63
equity) and to the jury’s fact-finding powers. It also invokes history
64
The
in its provision that the right to jury trial is “preserved.”
Seventh Amendment does not, however, protect juries’ law-deciding
authority; it only protects the jury’s fact-finding authority from review
by the courts. The next section briefly describes the interpretive
problems that have faced the courts since the Seventh Amendment’s
ratification in 1791.
B. Interpretation
1. Language
The courts have faced a number of questions regarding the
Seventh Amendment over the course of the country’s history. What,
for example, is meant by “suits at common law”? Does the phrase
encompass statutory actions? Courts have also asked what is meant by
60

See Wolfram, supra note 50, at 657-61. Proponents of the new Constitution
defended the omission of a right to a civil jury, arguing, among other things, that the
omission did not abolish the right to a civil jury, but only left it in the capable hands
of Congress. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 83 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987)
(1788). This was too-small comfort for proponents of the civil jury.
61
Bill of Rights, 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
62
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
63
The federal courts that were established under the Judiciary Act of 1789 were
unitary—they they handled both legal and equitable matters, though they used
different procedures for the two kinds of matters. See SWARD, supra note 2, at 103.
Until promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, federal courts
were required to use the procedures of the state in which they were sitting in all
common law matters. See Practice Conformity Act, ch. 225, 17 Stat. 197 (1872). See
generally ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 428-29 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing
the Conformity Act). The practice originated with the First Congress. See Process
Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). When federal courts heard equitable
matters, they followed the Federal Equity Rules, first promulgated in 1822. See Rules
of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822);
see also Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) (granting the Supreme
Court authority to promulgate rules for equity practice).
64
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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“preserving” the right to jury trial. Are we bound strictly to the
historical right, or can changes in the common law result in changes
65
in the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial? What exactly is the
nature of the right that is preserved? Does the reference to the factfinding authority of the jury in the Amendment’s second clause help
define that fundamental right?
In approaching these questions it is helpful to break the
Amendment into its constituent parts—something that the courts
have done implicitly almost since the Amendment’s adoption. The
most reasonable parsing of the Amendment, and the one most
consistent with judicial practice, is as follows:
[A] In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, [1] the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and [2] no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to
66
the rules of the common law.

This gives the Amendment an introductory clause that limits the right
defined in the Amendment to “Suits at common law.” It then
continues with two separate clauses. The first “preserve[s]” the right
to jury trial, and I shall refer to it as the Preservation Clause. The
second, commonly referred to as the Re-Examination Clause, bars
courts from re-examining jury verdicts except in accordance with
common law rules. The Amendment as a whole is a response to the
complaints raised during the ratification debates that the
67
Constitution lacked protection for the civil jury.
The ReExamination Clause responds to the specific fear that the Supreme
Court’s appellate power “both as to Law and Fact” would negate any
68
jury right that the Amendment otherwise provided.
One of the earliest expositors of the Seventh Amendment was
Justice Story. To this day courts frequently cite to his opinion in the
69
1830 case Parsons v. Bedford. In Parsons, Justice Story noted that the
Seventh Amendment “requires that the right of trial by jury shall be
70
preserved in suits at common law.”
However, he also stated
65

For discussions of static versus dynamic interpretations of the Seventh
Amendment, see Wolfram, supra note 50, at 731-47; Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 504-17
(1998).
66
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
67
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
68
See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
69
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
70
See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446-47. Justice Story’s statement is a juxtaposition of
phrases. In the Seventh Amendment, the language “in Suits at common law” comes
before the language saying that the right to trial by jury is to be preserved. See U.S.
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unequivocally that the Re-Examination Clause, which was at issue in
71
Parsons, was the more important clause of the Seventh Amendment.
72
He described it as “a substantial and independent clause.”
Nevertheless, the decision in Parsons turned more on the law/equity
distinction than on the precise meaning of the Re-Examination
Clause and the case is cited most often for its interpretation of the
73
phrase “Suits at common law.”
The question in Parsons was whether the trial court had erred in
refusing to allow evidence to be recorded at the trial as permitted
under Louisiana procedural rules, which were applicable in the
74
federal courts under the Conformity Act. The only purpose for such
recording was to allow the appellate court to review the jury’s fact75
finding. The argument in favor of recording was that the matter was
not a common law matter because it was a diversity case that arose in
76
Louisiana, which used a variant of civil law, not common law. The
Court rejected this argument, holding that the phrase “common law”
in the Seventh Amendment was meant to distinguish equity,
77
admiralty, and maritime law. In other words, anything that was not
equity, admiralty, or maritime law was common law within the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment. The Court said,
By common law, [the framers] meant what the constitution
denominated in the third article “law;” not merely suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but
suits in which legal rights were asserted to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of public
law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same

CONST. amend. VII.
71
See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447.
72
Id. Indeed, in United States v. Wonson, Justice Story misquoted the Amendment,
putting a period after “preserved” and capitalizing “and,” thus emphasizing the
independence of the clauses. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
Justice Story also misquoted the Amendment in Parsons v. Bedford, quoting the ReExamination Clause as stating that “no fact once tried by jury shall be otherwise reexaminable in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.” 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (emphasis added).
73
See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. 526 U.S. 687,
726 n.1 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
523 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1998).
74
See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 435-36. For a discussion of the Conformity Act, see supra
note 63.
75
See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 435-36.
76
See id. at 436.
77
See id. at 446.
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78

suit.

The matter at issue in Parsons did not involve equity, admiralty, or
maritime law, and it therefore fell within the Seventh Amendment’s
definition of “common law.” As the Seventh Amendment permitted
no appellate review of the jury’s fact-finding in “[s]uits at common
law,” the trial judge had not erred in refusing to permit recording of
79
the evidence.
An equally important statement of the Seventh Amendment’s
meaning came from Justice Story while he was sitting as a circuit
80
81
justice. In Wonson v. United States, the losing party in a federal
district court sought to have his case retried in a circuit court by
82
another jury. The matter was partly one of statutory construction, as
Congress had enacted a series of somewhat confusing and
inconsistent statutes governing the appellate jurisdiction of various
83
courts. Consistent with now-familiar rules of construction, Justice
Story interpreted the statutes to make them consistent with the
Constitution. Citing the common law of England, the Justice noted
that facts found by a jury could never be re-examined at common law
“unless a new trial is granted in the discretion of the court, before
which the suit is depending, for good cause shown; or unless the
judgment of such court is reversed by a superior tribunal, on a writ of
84
error, and a venire facias de novo is awarded.” He noted further
that a writ of error allows examination of “general errors of law only,”
and the appeals court “never can re-try the issues already settled by a
85
jury, where the judgment of the inferior court is affirmed.” In other
words, trial judges could order a new trial for good cause, but

78

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 455.
80
The first judiciary act set up two kinds of lower federal courts, denominated
district courts and circuit courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The two
kinds of courts, however, bore little resemblance to the modern courts bearing those
names. Both courts could hold trials, though their jurisdiction was somewhat
different. Circuit courts, however, could also function as courts of appeals from
district court decisions. For appellate matters, circuit courts were staffed by two
justices of the Supreme Court sitting as circuit justices, and by a judge from the
district court, probably the same judge who had decided the case initially. For
discussions of this early history, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28-31 (4th ed. 1996);
ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987).
81
28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
82
Id. at 750.
83
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745-47.
84
Id. at 750.
85
Id.
79
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appellate courts could only deal with alleged errors of law. This is
the virtually contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the
Re-Examination Clause.
While Justice Story’s exposition has served as the foundation on
which Seventh Amendment analysis has been built, courts and
commentators have paid much more attention to the Amendment’s
first clause than the second clause. Despite Justice Story’s insistence
that the two clauses are independent, there appear to be substantial
connections between them.
One is the common law.
The
introductory clause of the Amendment ties the two together by
limiting application of both clauses of the Amendment to “Suits at
common law.” Another linkage between the two clauses is also
apparent. The Preservation Clause preserves the right to jury trial,
87
but does not define that right. The Re-Examination Clause helps to
define the jury trial right, by protecting the jury’s fact-finding
authority. Indeed, defining the right to jury trial as the right to have
the jury find facts constitutes one of the Supreme Court’s principle
88
definitions of this preserved fundamental right.
Defining the right in this manner is consistent with English
practice, where the law/fact distinction was the principle means of
allocating decision-making authority between judge and jury. Justice
Story, in describing the Re-Examination Clause as the more
important of the Seventh Amendment’s two clauses, recognized the
significance of the jury’s fact-finding authority. I have already
demonstrated that the law/fact distinction is not an easy one to
articulate or to use, but it is at least a start. A brief look at how the
Court has handled the law/equity and law/fact distinctions in
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence reveals that the Court has been
much more protective of the law/equity distinction than of the
law/fact distinction.

86

Trial courts could order a new trial if the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. See, e.g., Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (1757); Wood v.
Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (1655). Henderson, however, says that the
practice was not firmly established until 1836. See Henderson, supra note 43, at 311.
This is another example of the difficulty of determining what the rules were in
England in 1791.
87
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
88
See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498
(1931); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920); Walker v. N.W. & S. Pac. R.R.
Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1897). See also Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear:
The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
183, 200-07 (2000).
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2. Common Law and Equity
In United States v. Wonson, Justice Story said that the Seventh
Amendment’s reliance on the common law of England to define a
suit at common law was “obvious to every person acquainted with the
89
history of the law.” Justice Story thought it unnecessary to expound
90
on the reasons for this reliance. But the distinction between law and
equity was not as clear in the new federal courts, or in many of the
states, as it was in England. Congress created lower federal courts in
91
1789, but it did not create separate courts of law and equity.
Litigants, however, still filed cases in either law or equity. Although
92
different procedural rules applied to legal and equitable cases, the
same judges heard both, sitting in either law or equity as each case
demanded. As long as this clear separation was maintained, there
were few conflicts over the right to jury trial in the federal courts.
Those that did arise, as in Wonson and Parsons, tended to concern not
the initial assignment of the matter to law or equity, but questions
about the courts’ power to review jury verdicts.
The matter became more complicated as law and equity merged
beginning with the state courts in the mid-nineteenth century. The
Conformity Act required that federal courts follow state procedures
93
in common law actions, but as states eliminated the distinction
between law and equity, it became more difficult for federal judges to
determine what procedures to apply—state procedures or federal
94
equity rules.
While it was implicit in Justice Story’s opinions in
Wonson and Parsons, it was not until the 1935 cases of Dimick v.

89

Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750.
One commentator has suggested that the reliance on English common law was
a twentieth century development, and that nineteenth century Supreme Court cases
tended to look to both English and American precedent, especially when analyzing
the Preservation Clause. See Moses, supra note 88, at 187-92. The reference to “Suits
at common law” in the Seventh Amendment is logically read as referring to both
clauses, and it follows that the test for determining whether the matter is a suit at
common law should be the same for both clauses.
91
See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 2-4 (1789).
92
See supra note 63.
93
See id..
94
See, e.g., Gudger v. W. N.C.R. Co., 21 F. 81 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1884) (refusing to
allow a single cause of action blending legal and equitable claims despite a state code
that merged law and equity); Montejo v. Owen, 17 F. Cas. 610 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877)
(No. 9,722) (applying federal equity rules to an equitable defense despite the New
York state rule that merged law and equity and allowed an equitable defense to be
asserted to a common law claim); Beardsley v. Littell, 2 F. Cas. 1178 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1877) (No. 1,185) (refusing to allow pre-trial examination of witnesses in a legal
action despite a state code that merged law and equity and would have allowed it).
90
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96

Scheidt and Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman that the Court
stated explicitly that courts should look to the English common law in
1791—the year of the Amendment’s ratification—to define the
distinction between law and equity.
Three years later, in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
took effect, merging law and equity under a single set of procedures
97
in the federal courts. Although the issue then became more acute
for the courts, the Supreme Court’s first significant statement about
the effect of the merger on the definition of law and equity did not
98
come until 1959. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, the Court held
that when legal and equitable matters are presented in the same case,
there is a right to trial by jury as to all facts that are common to the
legal and equitable issues, as well as facts that are particular to the
99
legal issues.
This outcome resulted from changes in procedural
rules, which eliminated the grounds for equitable action in many
100
cases.
Thus, procedural changes could result in apparent
expansion of the right to jury trial.
In 1974, the Court started down a path that brought history even
more squarely into the Seventh Amendment analysis of the
101
distinction between law and equity. In Curtis v. Loether, the Court
held that the Seventh Amendment applies to “actions enforcing
statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for
102
damages in the ordinary courts of law.”
While this is certainly
reminiscent of Parsons v. Bedford, which held that the statute-based
civil law of Louisiana was “common law” for purposes of the Seventh
103
Amendment, Curtis opened the door to an explicit historical test to
distinguish law and equity. The test, which was implicit in Curtis but
95

295 U.S. 654 (1935).
293 U.S. 474 (1935).
97
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2nd §§ 1041-45 (1987).
98
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
99
See id. at 510-11. For a more detailed discussion of Beacon Theatres, see SWARD,
supra note 2, at 162-65.
100
See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-10; see also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962) (holding that a jury trial was required in an action seeking injunctive
relief and equitable accounting because the underlying relief requested was legal
and the Federal Rules’ provision for masters eliminates the need for equity to act);
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (holding that a jury was required for a
shareholders’ derivative suit because the underlying claim was legal). For a more
detailed discussion of these cases, see SWARD, supra note 2, at 166-68.
101
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
102
Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
103
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
96
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became explicit thirteen years later in Tull v. United States, has two
steps: first, the Court must find an English claim that existed at the
time of the Seventh Amendment’s ratification and is analogous to the
statutory claim at issue; second, the Court must examine the remedy
105
to determine if it is legal or equitable. The Court has continued to
106
apply this test despite some misgivings among various justices.
Indeed, the Court applies this test not only to statutory actions, but to
common law actions as well, though common law actions are often
107
easier to characterize.
In short, history is at least nominally quite important in the
Seventh Amendment analysis of the distinction between law and
equity. A purely historical analysis, however, would hold that the
right to jury trial prevails only in those precise cases where a jury
108
would have been available in 1791 England.
The current test
104

481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
See id.
106
See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
Terry generated spirited disagreement about whether this historical approach is
appropriate. See id. at 574-81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the first step
should be eliminated and courts should rely solely on the historical remedy); see also
id. at 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that precise analogies are
unnecessary, but that the Court should decide based on whether the matter is similar
to one that common law courts would have handled in England in 1791); id. at 58495 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first step should determine the
matter). All of these opinions, however, look to history to some degree. The Court
still refers to the two-part test in determining whether the matter is legal or
equitable. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
107
See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42-49 (1989) (applying
the test to common law fraudulent conveyance actions in bankruptcy court). The
test will be easy to apply if the cause of action existed in England in 1791, but there
are circumstances where the analysis could be complicated even for common law
actions. The first circumstance is when an action did not exist at common law, but
has evolved in the United States since 1791. An example is dram shop liability, which
holds a barkeeper liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated person who drank at
his bar. Compare Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (Ill. 1889) (saying that it was not a tort
at common law to supply alcoholic beverages to a “strong and able-bodied man”),
with Schelin v. Goldberg, 146 A.2d 648, 652-53 (Pa. 1958) (recognizing liability of bar
owner for injuries to patron when bar owner served patron knowing that he was
already intoxicated). For a history of social host and dramshop liability, see Robert
G. Franks, Note, Common Law Liability of Liquor Vendors, 31 MONT. L. REV. 241, 242-48
(1970). Another circumstance is where the action existed in England in 1791, but
there was a choice of remedy. An example is breach of contract, which in 1791
England, could be heard in a court of law if money damages were sought, or in a
court of equity if various equitable remedies, such as rescission, reformation, or
specific performance, were sought. In the latter instance, the nature of the remedy,
the second step in the two-step analysis, would be the determining factor.
108
Some commentators have suggested such an analysis. See, e.g., Martin H.
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decisionmaking, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975).
105
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requires jury trials in some actions that would have been equitable in
eighteenth century England, and it requires jury trials in some
109
actions that did not exist in eighteenth century England.
History,
therefore, comes into play in analogizing modern actions to actions
that existed in England in 1791.
3. Law and Fact
In Beacon Theatres, the Court allowed a procedural change, the
merger of law and equity, to affect the right to a jury trial. The
change resulted in more cases being tried to a jury than would have
been tried to a jury in England in 1791. By contrast, a number of
other procedural changes have affected analysis of the law/fact
distinction, and the Court has been less protective of the jury in the
face of those changes. The Court has repeatedly made it clear that
courts are not tied to the precise procedures available in 1791 English
courts, and therefore, that procedural changes can affect the jury’s
domain as long as they do not undercut the “fundamental” right to a
110
jury trial.
The Court has not clearly defined the “fundamental”
right, but has suggested that the jury’s fact-finding role is
111
fundamental.
Indeed, some recent cases have suggested that the Court is
growing more concerned about protecting the jury’s fact-finding
authority. For example, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
112
Inc., the Court overturned a judgment as a matter of law on the
grounds that the lower court, in granting the judgment, had ignored
evidence in favor of the non-moving party and had failed to draw all
113
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
In fact,
there is some evidence that the Supreme Court is somewhat more
114
protective than lower courts of the jury’s fact-finding role.
But if
the Supreme Court is concerned about preserving the jury’s factfinding role, it might have to reconsider 130 years of history. Over
the course of that history questions of fact have been transformed
109

My own view is that the right to jury trial is sufficiently important that this
expansion is quite proper. See generally SWARD, supra note 2, at ch. 2 (describing the
value of the civil jury).
110
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-92 (1943).
111
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 88.
112
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
113
See id. at 152-54.
114
See, e.g., Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 141, 205-18 (2000) (discussing recent Supreme Court cases on summary
judgment); Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries – Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 298-313 (discussing lower court and Supreme Court
rulings on judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
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into questions of law, with the result that judges decide matters today
that would have been decided by juries in England in 1791. The next
section details that development.
III. HOW FACT BECAME LAW: TRACING THE ORIGINS OF DIRECTED
VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
The transformation of fact into law is best demonstrated by
starting with the most significant case in this development and
tracing the doctrine back through the cases it cites. This analysis
starts with an important doctrinal change that preceded all
procedural developments: the adoption of the “reasonable jury” test.
115
It then examines the directed verdict and Galloway v. United States,
which held that the directed verdict procedure did not violate the
Seventh Amendment. It then examines judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, focusing on the most significant case, Baltimore & Carolina
116
Line, Inc. v. Redman.
Finally, the inquiry shifts to an evaluation of
summary judgment. This is a more difficult analysis because the
Supreme Court has not explicitly considered whether the current
summary judgment procedure is constitutional. An early Supreme
Court opinion and several lower court decisions shed light on the
constitutionality of summary judgement, however, and serve as a
starting point. Three 1986 cases, widely thought to have changed
summary judgment practice, are also relevant. Finally, this section
traces the transformation of fact into law and thereby illustrates this
article’s thesis: judges now decide matters that would have been
decided by juries at common law.
A. The Unifying Test: The Reasonable Jury
The most significant shift in the law relating to the law-fact
distinction was the recognition of the “reasonable jury” standard.
Under this standard a judge can take a case from the jury by a variety
of devices if there is no substantial evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could reach a verdict in favor of one party; in other words, if
117
there is only one reasonable outcome.
The key word is
“reasonable” because the cases suggest that what is “reasonable” is
often in the eyes of the beholder. Indeed, many of the cases
115

319 U.S. 372 (1943).
295 U.S. 654 (1935).
117
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The test is often referred
to as the “substantial evidence” test. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
564-66 (3d ed. 1999).
116
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discussed in this section demonstrate that reasonable people can
disagree about what is reasonable. This section explores the origins
118
of the shift to the reasonable jury standard.
The shift began in the United States with the Supreme Court’s
119
1871 decision in Improvement Company v. Munson.
It appears from
the complicated facts that the plaintiffs and defendants had
120
conflicting claims for land in Pennsylvania.
Surveys taken at the
times of the initial land grants put the respective parcels some miles
121
122
A later survey produced the conflict.
apart from one another.
The lower court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiffs on the
ground that there was no evidence of authorization for the later
survey and subsequent surveys done without authorization were
123
invalid.
That being the case, the court held that there was no
124
conflict in the ownership.
The Supreme Court affirmed, applying the settled rule that a
case should not be submitted to the jury where there is no evidence
on the subject, but the court thought it was adopting a new rule for
125
determining whether there was any evidence in the record.
The
Court said:
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of
evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to
the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a
more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is
left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not
whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any
upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the
126
party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.

The Court then found that the defendants were asking, in effect, that
the court apply a presumption: that the presence of a second survey is

118

It is reasonable to ask, if we are examining a shift, what came before the
“reasonable jury” standard. The answer is not entirely clear, though the former test
has often been referred to as the “scintilla” test—as long as there was a scintilla of
evidence for the non-moving party, the case had to go to the jury. See, e.g.,
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871). It is clear, however,
that the reasonable jury standard made it easier to take cases away from the jury.
119
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871).
120
Id. at 442-46.
121
Id. at 444-45.
122
See generally id. at 443-46.
123
See id. at 446.
124
Id.
125
Munson, 81 U.S. at 448.
126
Id. (emphasis in original).
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presumptive evidence of that survey’s proper authorization.
The
Court refused to apply this presumption, and thus, the absence of any
128
evidence establishing authorization was determinative.
In other
words, the Court in Munson refused to allow the jury to infer
authorization from the existence of the second survey because such
an inference would undermine its ruling on an evidentiary
presumption. A decision not to employ a presumption is more a
129
question of law than of fact. Under this reading, Munson has come
to stand for more than its facts would seem to warrant because there
was, literally, no evidence of a critical fact: authorization for the
second survey.
130
that the Court
The “recent decisions of high authority”
referred to were mostly English cases. The earliest of these was Jewell
131
v. Parr, decided in 1853, and it is apparently the first case to hold
that a court can take a case from the jury even when there is some
132
evidence on both sides. Jewell was a suit by an indorsee on a bill of
133
exchange against an acceptor for recovery of the value of the bill.
The acceptor claimed that he had accepted the bill without
consideration solely to accommodate the drawer, and that the drawer
134
had paid the bill when it became due.
Apparently, however, the
drawer had thereafter used the fully-paid bill as payment for another
135
debt, and the creditor presented it to the acceptor for payment.
There was no direct evidence as to payment by the drawer, who was
dead, but there were some indeterminate notations on the bill,
including a due date that was earlier than the creditor’s acquisition of
136
the bill.
The only clear evidence of payment was the acceptor’s
137
The jury returned a verdict for the acceptor, and the
testimony.
138
indorsee was given leave to move for judgment.
The court then ordered judgment for the indorsee on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that the bill had been

127

See id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
129
See THAYER, supra note 3, at 212-13.
130
Munson, 81 U.S. at 448.
131
13. C.B. 909, 138 Eng. Rep. 1460 (1853).
132
Jewell, 138 Eng. Rep. at 1464-65.
133
Id. at 1460-61.
134
Id. at 1461.
135
See id. The plaintiff was the indorsee of the person who had obtained the
allegedly fully paid bill. Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 1460-61.
138
Jewell, 138 Eng. Rep. at 1461.
128
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Justice Maule said,

Perhaps it cannot with strict propriety be said . . . that there is no
evidence to go to the jury. . . . [W]hen we say that there is no
evidence to go to a jury, we do not mean that there is literally
none, but that there is none which ought reasonably to satisfy a
140
jury that the fact sought to be proved is established.

The issue was not strictly factual, however: there was a hint of a legal
issue in the case as well. The chief justice noted that the acceptor,
not the drawer, is the person primarily responsible for paying the bill.
If the drawer had in fact paid it, the acceptor’s recourse was against
141
the drawer.
Thus, if the court had allowed the jury’s verdict to
stand, the rule that the acceptor was chiefly responsible for paying
the bill would have been undermined, as any acceptor could claim
payment by the drawer and put the credibility issue to the jury. The
issue in Jewell can be characterized, therefore, as a mixed question of
law and fact.
This case does indicate a shift in English practice toward
awarding judgments inconsistent with the jury’s verdict when there is
evidence going both ways, but there are factors that should have
limited its reach in American jurisprudence. First, as noted, the
decision was necessary in order to preserve a rule of law concerning
who had primary responsibility for paying a bill. Second, the case,
decided in 1853, is not part of the background of the Seventh
Amendment, which was adopted in 1791. Furthermore, the fact that
Jewell cited no authority for the proposition that a court could take a
case from the jury if there was no evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could find for one of the parties suggests that this notion
originated with the Jewell court, more than 60 years after the Seventh
Amendment’s ratification.
142
Munson next cited Ryder v. Wombwell, decided in 1868. There,
the question was whether a minor could be held to his debt on the
ground that the debt was for “necessaries,” goods that were necessary

139

Id. at 1463-65.
Id. at 1463. Indeed the court suggested that the evidence on that question
allowed no firm conclusion for either party, which meant that the party with the
burden of proof—the defendant on his defense of payment—could not prevail. See
id. The defense of payment would now be deemed an affirmative defense in federal
practice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). In common law parlance, it was called an
avoidance. The court in Jewell did not use the term “avoidance,” but it is clear that
the court viewed the matter as imposing a burden of proof on the defendant, which
could only be the case if the defense were an avoidance.
141
See id. at 1463.
142
L.R., 4 Ex. 32 (1868).
140
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to his station in life.
The minor, a younger son of a deceased
baronet, had purchased an antique silver goblet and a pair of jeweled
144
solitaires. The jury found that the goods were necessaries, but the
court believed that there was no evidence that the goods were
145
necessary to the defendant’s station in life. The court applied the
146
reasonable jury test announced in Jewell v. Parr, but it avoided
deciding the question of fact by holding, in accordance with cited
147
authority, that the goods were not prima facie necessary, and that it
was incumbent upon the plaintiff to offer evidence that they were
148
149
necessary. The court ordered a nonsuit because the plaintiff did
150
not provide such evidence. Again, there are significant differences
between this case and modern American practice. First, a nonsuit is
not the same as entering a judgment for the defendant. A nonsuit
gives the plaintiff the opportunity to try again with better evidence.
Second, Ryder is really a decision that the plaintiff simply lacked
necessary evidence under the substantive rule that the court was to
apply. It did not involve weighing evidence, though it would have if
the plaintiff and defendant had each presented evidence on whether
the goods were necessaries. Thus, there was literally no evidence to
support the plaintiff’s claim.
The Court in Munson also cited two other English cases and one
earlier decision of its own. The two English cases had been cited in
Ryder, and both were decided in 1857—four years after Jewell. The
first of these was Toomey v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway
151
Co. The plaintiff in Toomey was an illiterate man who asked a fellow
152
passenger for directions to the rest room at the railroad station.
When he followed those directions, he found two doors and
153
mistakenly chose the one leading to a basement. He fell down the
154
The court, affirming that more than a
stairs and was injured.
scintilla was required to send the case to the jury, found for the
143

See id. at 38.
See id. at 33.
145
See id. at 37.
146
See id. at 39.
147
See id. at 40-41.
148
Id.
149
A nonsuit allowed the court to dismiss the case without prejudice to the
plaintiff. It was generally done when the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence on
an essential element, and it allowed the plaintiff to start over.
150
See id. at 42.
151
3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (1857).
152
Id. at 694-95.
153
Id.
154
Id.
144
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defendant railroad on the question whether the railroad company
155
was negligent. The court seemed to blame the plaintiff for his own
carelessness, but also noted that the stairs presented no more than
156
It suggested that if there had been evidence
the normal danger.
that the stairs were more than ordinarily dangerous, the plaintiff
157
might have been successful.
A nonsuit against the plaintiff was,
158
therefore, affirmed.
In the second case cited by the Munson Court, Wheelton v.
159
Hardisty, the plaintiffs were beneficiaries under a life insurance
160
policy. The plaintiffs had loaned the insured a large sum of money
with the insured’s reversionary interest in his father’s estate as
161
If the insured did not survive his father, however, the
security.
162
security would be worthless; hence, the need for the life insurance.
Upon the death of the insured, the insurance company refused to
pay on the ground that the insured had given false statements about
163
his health.
The false statements were given to the plaintiffs,
164
Believing the
however, and not to the insurance company.
statements to be true, the plaintiffs had transmitted the allegedly false
medical information to the insurance company in their application
165
for insurance. The jury found no fraud on the part of the plaintiffs,
166
and the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on three counts.
However, the court entered judgment for the defendants on a claim
that plaintiffs had warranted the truth of the statements made in
167
their application. The issues in the reported case were whether the
insured’s fraud should be imputed to the plaintiffs and whether the
168
record contained any evidence of warranty. The court held that the
insured’s fraud should not be imputed to the plaintiffs, who were also

155

Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
157
Toomey, 140 Eng. Rep. at 696.
158
See id. at 695, 696. Recall that a nonsuit allowed the plaintiff to try again.
Thus, if the plaintiff could amass additional evidence of extraordinary
dangerousness, he might ultimately succeed.
159
8 El. & Bl. 232, 120 Eng. Rep. 86 (1857).
160
Id. at 86-87.
161
Id.
162
See id. at 89.
163
Id. at 86-87.
164
Id. at 92.
165
See Wheelton, 120 Eng. Rep. at 92.
166
Id.
167
See id.
168
Id.
156
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169

victims of the insured’s false statements.
But the court,
emphasizing that the “scintilla” rule had been abandoned in favor of
170
the reasonable jury standard, held that there was “no such proof in
this case as would justify the jury in finding the issue [of warranty] for
171
the plaintiffs.” The court found that the evidence was inconclusive
as to whether the plaintiffs were induced to enter into the contract of
insurance by a prospectus from the defendants in which the
defendants said that their insurance would be unquestionable except
172
in case of fraud. As the plaintiffs had the burden of proof on this
173
The court also said, however, that it
issue, they could not prevail.
would be inclined to treat the insured’s fraud as negating the policy
174
under the terms of the prospectus.
Both Toomey and Wheelton reaffirm the decision in Jewell to
abandon the scintilla test in favor of a reasonable jury test. In both
cases, however, there was no disputed fact for the jury to decide. In
Toomey, there was no dispute about the circumstances under which
the man fell down the stairs. The only question regarded the fall’s
legal significance. Similarly, in Wheelton, everyone agreed that the
plaintiffs were as unaware of the insured’s fraud as the defendants
were. The issue was the effect of that fraud on the insurance policy
175
that the plaintiffs had purchased. Again, the question was more law
than fact. These cases can be read as applications of the English rule
that juries decide disputed questions of fact, but judges decide the
176
application of law to those facts.
The last case cited by Munson was a Supreme Court case,
177
Schuchardt v. Allens.
In Schuchardt the plaintiffs claimed breach of
warranty in connection with their purchase of material used in
178
dyeing. The plaintiffs had purchased the material based on a single
bottle, despite the fact that they had not been permitted to open the
bottle to inspect its contents. The defendant asked the court to
instruct the jury that there was no warranty, or that if there was, it was
an implied warranty such that plaintiffs would have to establish
169

See id. at 97.
See id. at 98.
171
Wheelton, 120 Eng. Rep. at 98.
172
See id.
173
Id.
174
See id. at 99.
175
Id.
176
See Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 205-06, 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 508-09 (N.P.
1793). For a discussion of this rule, see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
177
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 359 (1863).
178
Id. at 359-60.
170
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179

fraud.
The court refused, and the jury returned a verdict for the
180
plaintiffs.
The Court found that the proposed instructions sought
181
to take the case away from the jury and noted that instructions that
seek to bind the jury’s fact-finding are proper because they are
182
equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence.
However, the Court
found that the jury was justified in inferring a warranty. In other
words, the Court held that the lower court properly allowed the jury
183
to decide whether the facts supported an inference of a warranty.
Thus, Munson cited Schuchardt primarily for its language suggesting
that a case could be taken from the jury on a demurrer to the
evidence.
In short, neither Munson nor the cases it relies on support a
radical transformation of the law/fact distinction whereby judges can
take pure questions of fact away from the jury. At best, these cases
suggest that courts can take such matters from the jury when allowing
the jury to decide the matter could undermine a rule of law. They
might also reinforce the English rule that judges decide the
application of law to undisputed facts. They might even be
characterized as mixed questions of law and fact. However, in no way
can these cases be construed as allowing judges to take cases away
from the jury when there are disputes of pure questions of fact,
unmixed with law.
B. Directed Verdict: Galloway v. United States
The first case to explicitly approve the directed verdict
procedure provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
184
Galloway v. United States.
In Galloway, the Court tied the directed
verdict to the common law demurrer to the evidence, which gave it a
grounding in common law procedure, but Galloway also held that
courts were not bound to the precise contours of common law
procedural devices. Therefore, the fact that the directed verdict
operated differently from the demurrer to the evidence did not
185
render the directed verdict unconstitutional.
This notion was not
new; Galloway cited several earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases in
support of the proposition that the Seventh Amendment did not

179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 393.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 370.
Id.
319 U.S. 372 (1943).
Id. at 392.
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demand fidelity to common law procedures.
Each of these cases,
however, involved procedural changes that nevertheless left the factfinding in the jury’s hands. One case allowed courts to order new
187
trials limited to damages.
Another approved the appointment of
auditors to conduct accountings, with the final decision as to the
188
accounting left with the jury. A third approved a procedure where
a jury trial could be held before a justice of the peace, with an appeal
permitted to the ordinary trial court, which would then conduct a
189
second jury trial.
Galloway is inconsistent with the precedent it cited in two ways.
First, unlike the cases discussed earlier, Galloway approved a
procedure that took a disputed question of fact out of the hands of
the jury. In that sense, it went beyond being a mere procedural
change. Second, the kinds of questions that the old demurrer to the
evidence took from the jury were really questions of law. Galloway, by
190
contrast, involved a disputed question of fact. In other words, while
earlier cases distinguished fairly effectively between both substance
and procedure and law and fact, Galloway muddied both distinctions.
In the remainder of this section, I will concentrate on the law/fact
distinction. To see the difference between Galloway and the cases it
relied on, I will present a detailed exposition of all of these cases. I
start with Galloway itself.
Galloway concerned an insurance claim by an Army veteran,
under a military insurance policy that paid benefits for permanent
191
and total disability.
The policy expired on May 31, 1919, so
Galloway had to prove that he was permanently and totally disabled as
192
of that date. This is quite clearly a question of fact, though it can be
a complicated one. The suit was brought in 1938, by which time
everyone involved agreed that Galloway had been permanently and

186

See id.(citing Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494
(1931); Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S.
1 (1899); Walker v. N.W. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897)).
187
See Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 500.
188
See Peterson, 253 U.S. at 306-11.
189
See Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 45. The Court avoided the strictures of the
Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause by holding that a jury trial before a
justice of the peace is not a jury trial within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.
Id. A fourth case cited by Galloway approved the special verdict, with the jury finding
facts and the judge applying the law to those facts. See Walker, 165 U.S. at 598. The
Court in Walker noted, however, that this procedure was consistent with the common
law. See id. at 596-97.
190
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372.
191
Id. at 373-75.
192
Id.
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totally disabled by reason of mental illness for at least six years.
Galloway’s evidence consisted of testimony from a boyhood friend
who described Galloway’s mental condition before and after Galloway
served in France during World War I; the testimony of two fellow
soldiers from the war; the testimony of two superior officers from two
tours of duty after the war; and the testimony of a chaplain who
194
thought he had seen Galloway in a mental hospital in 1920.
The
trial court discounted the chaplain’s testimony, however, because it
was inconsistent with records showing that Galloway was serving in
195
the Navy at that time.
The rest of the evidence tended to show
mental instability during and after the war. This evidence showed
Galloway to be mentally unstable from about 1918 to the early- to
196
mid-1920s, and possibly as late as 1925; however, there was no
197
evidence for the period between 1925 and 1930. The most crucial
evidence in favor of Galloway’s claim was the testimony of an expert
witness, a medical doctor who examined Galloway shortly before the
trial and testified that some people are born with an inherent
instability that can be triggered by traumatic experiences, such as
198
The doctor expressed the opinion
Galloway’s service in the war.
that Galloway had become insane during the war and had continued
in that state ever since, though the nature of his illness meant that he
199
could have periods of relative stability.
The trial court directed a verdict for the government, and the
200
court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court by a vote of six to
three agreed, holding that no reasonable jury could find for the
plaintiff when there was so large and so unexplained a gap in the
201
evidence. The Court found that the plaintiff should have been able
to produce evidence as to his condition between 1925 and 1930, and
his failure to do so could lead only to the conclusion that he was sane
202
during those years.
Galloway’s attorney had attempted to explain
193

A guardian was appointed in February 1932. Id. at 374. However, there was
also evidence that Galloway had sought treatment for mental illness as early as 1930.
Id. at 383 n.10.
194
Id.
195
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 379-80. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he chaplain’s
testimony . . . should have been stricken had the case gone to the jury . . . .” Id. at
384-85 n.11.
196
Id. at 381-82.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Galloway v. United States, 130 F.2d 467 (1942).
201
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396.
202
Id. at 384-87.
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the absence of evidence by noting that Galloway was a deserter from
the Army and sought to avoid people he knew in order to escape
203
detection and punishment. The Court rejected this explanation on
the ground that, among other things, Galloway married during the
period and his wife, who was his legal guardian, could have
204
testified.
The Supreme Court also rejected Galloway’s argument that the
directed verdict violated the Seventh Amendment, reasoning that the
practice was too well-established in the United States to question it at
205
that late date.
The Court held that the Seventh Amendment did
not bind courts to the exact procedural devices that existed in
England in 1791, but allowed for some development in procedures
while preserving “the basic institution of jury trial in only its most
206
fundamental elements.”
The Court emphasized that jury practice
was evolving even when the Seventh Amendment was ratified, and
207
was, therefore, not “crystallized in a fixed and immutable system.”
The Supreme Court finally held that changes in the standards of
proof for submitting the case to the jury were irrelevant because no
formulation of those standards allowed the jury to engage in
208
speculation, which the record in Galloway would have required.
Three justices dissented, primarily on Seventh Amendment
grounds, though they also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
209
The dissenters
that no reasonable jury could find for Galloway.
thought that the demurrer to the evidence, from which the directed
210
verdict descended, was too different from the modern directed

203

Id. at 385 n.13.
Id. The marriage took place on February 14, 1929. See Galloway, 130 F.2d at
470. The Court also noted that Galloway continued to be a deserter in 1930 when
doctors examined him for mental illness, and that his ability to successfully hide
himself for eight years suggested some mental agility. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 385 n.13.
205
See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 389. For a discussion as to whether post-1791
precedent can solidify a diminution of Seventh Amendment rights, see infra notes
496-498 and accompanying text.
206
Id. at 392.
207
Id. at 390-92, 391 n.23.
208
See id. at 395.
209
See id. at 396-411 (Black, J., dissenting).
210
Everyone seems to agree that the directed verdict descended from the
demurrer to the evidence, and that assumption is quite reasonable. See infra notes
216-302 and accompanying text. It is likely, however, that the nonsuit is also in the
family tree, and the nonsuit did not require entry of judgment, but allowed the
plaintiff to try again with more evidence. See Hopkins v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 34
S.W. 1029 (Tenn. 1896) (comparing demurrer to the evidence, involuntary nonsuit,
and directed verdict).
204
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verdict to withstand a Seventh Amendment challenge.
In
particular, the dissenters noted that the demurrer to the evidence was
quite risky because it required the demurring party to give up his
right to present evidence: once he had admitted the truth of the
opposing party’s evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences from
that evidence, he could not challenge the evidence or the
212
inferences.
The directed verdict has no such rule and, therefore,
makes it likely that more cases will be withdrawn from the jury. The
dissenters also complained that the evolution of the substantial
evidence or reasonable jury standard meant that courts took cases
from the jury under directed verdict practice that would have gone to
213
the jury under demurrer to the evidence practice.
Thus, the
dissenters saw the decision in Galloway as part of a pattern of
214
decisions that undermined the Seventh Amendment.
In contrast, the majority in Galloway saw their decision as the
logical and reasonable extension of a long line of previous cases. An
examination of authorities relied on by the Court suggests that the
dissenters were closer to the mark. The reason is not so much the
change in procedure—the directed verdict does seem to be a
reasonable development from its common law sources—but a change
in how the Court viewed questions of law and fact. The issue in
Galloway could not be classified as anything other than a question of
fact: was Galloway permanently and totally disabled by reason of
mental illness as of May 31, 1919, or not? Yet the Court treated it as a
question of law, holding that there was only one “reasonable”
inference from the facts, and therefore that Galloway had failed to
215
establish his case as a matter of law. After Galloway, fact has become
law. How did the Court get there?
The Court in Galloway cited several cases where courts had
directed verdicts due to insufficiency of the evidence. Only one of
these cases predated Munson, which had adopted the “reasonable
216
jury” test for federal courts. The early case, Parks v. Ross, is credited
as the first Supreme Court case involving a directed verdict. Decided
in 1850, Parks involved the westward migration of the Cherokee
Nation at the instigation of the United States in the late 1830s. Ross,
a Cherokee chief, was responsible for contracting with persons who

211
212
213
214
215
216

See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 399-404.
Id. at 402-03.
See id. at 403.
See id. at 405-06.
Id. at 396.
52 U.S. 362 (1850).
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were helping with the migration.
Among the items budgeted for
218
was the cost of returning wagons used in the migration. Plaintiff’s
intestate had owned four of the wagons, but he was a Cherokee and
219
Thus, he had settled his account in full
did not intend to return.
220
with Ross, who was acting on behalf of the Cherokee Nation.
Nevertheless, plaintiff Parks, on behalf of the decedent’s estate, sued
221
Ross personally seeking recovery of the cost of returning the wagons.
Following presentation of Parks’s case, Ross asked the court to
instruct the jury that if it believed the evidence, Parks was not entitled
222
223
to recover. This the court did, and the jury held for Ross.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that seeking the instruction
was similar to demurring to the evidence and, therefore, would be
tested by the same standard, which the Court described as whether
224
there was “some evidence legally sufficient to establish [the fact].”
The question, then, was whether Parks had produced legally
sufficient evidence that he was entitled to personally recover from
Ross the cost of returning the wagons. Unlike Galloway, this was a
case in which there was no evidence supporting plaintiff’s position.
The Court noted that Ross was a public official acting on behalf of
the Cherokee Nation, and that such officials are not personally liable
absent “satisfactory evidence of an absolute and unqualified
225
engagement to be personally liable.”
However, there was “no
evidence whatever tending to show a special contract by John Ross
personally to pay for the teams and wagons, either for going or
226
returning.” Indeed, the plaintiff’s intestate himself had never made
227
Arguably, the budget presented some
a claim for the return.
evidence that wagon owners would be paid for the return, but that
228
did not mean that Ross was personally liable.
Thus, there was no
evidence to weigh. Furthermore, because the case turned in part on
229
Ross’s status as an agent for the Cherokee Nation, this can be
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact.
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

See id. at 373-74.
See id. at 364.
See id. at 374.
See id. at 365.
Id. at 365-66, 374.
Id. at 368.
Parks, 52 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 373.
Parks, 52 U.S. at 374.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
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In addition to Parks, the other cases cited by Galloway are
similarly inapposite. For example, the decision in Munson, as I have
demonstrated, was primarily a ruling on evidence: whether the court
should allow the jury to infer a fact when to do so would be
230
inconsistent with the court’s ruling on an evidentiary presumption.
The existence of a presumption has always been a legal matter to be
231
decided by the judge. Thus, the issue in Munson was quite different
from the issue in Galloway.
232
In another case cited by Galloway, Pleasants v. Fant, the
question was whether the defendant Fant was a partner in a firm, a
233
status that would make him liable for the firm’s debts.
The
evidence showed that Fant had assisted the firm in securing a loan for
the purchase of cotton, and that the firm had voluntarily promised to
234
give him a part of any profits, though no sum was agreed upon.
The trial court instructed the jury that there was no evidence of
235
partnership, and entered judgment for Fant.
The Supreme Court
agreed, finding that because Fant could not have demanded an
accounting in a court of equity, he could not be considered a
236
partner. The Court conceded that the case might nonetheless have
gone to the jury under earlier case law but, citing Parks v. Ross and
237
Improvement Co. v. Munson, applied the reasonable jury standard.
Fant also differs from Galloway because there was no dispute
238
about what happened, at least on the record before the Court. The
outcome seemed to result from an application of what the Court
called “one of the most approved criteria of the existence of the
239
partnership,”
the ability of the alleged partner to seek an
accounting. Fant, who had only a voluntary promise that the firm
would pay him an unknown sum of money, had no power to seek an
240
accounting.
Thus, the Court’s decision can be viewed as applying
230

Id. at 448-51.
See THAYER, supra note 3 at 318-19. See generally id. at ch. VIII.
232
89 U.S. 116 (1874).
233
Id. at 116.
234
Id. at 117.
235
Id. at 116.
236
Id. at 120.
237
Id. at 120-21.
238
The plaintiff creditor offered testimony that a member of the debtor company
had told the creditor that Fant was a partner in the company, but the trial court
excluded the evidence, possibly on hearsay grounds. See Pleasants, 89 U.S. at 117.
Decisions about the admission or exclusion of evidence were questions of law for the
judge at common law. See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 235-36.
239
See Pleasants, 89 U.S. at 120.
240
Id. at 119-20.
231
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established law to established facts, a proper role for the judge under
eighteenth-century English law.
Next, the Galloway Court cited Commissioners of Marion County v.
241
Clark, which addressed whether a plaintiff bank was a bona fide
purchaser for value of bonds that had been issued based on
242
The lower court
fraudulent misrepresentations to the County.
instructed the jury that there was no evidence that the bank had any
notice of the fraud, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
243
bank, consistent with that instruction. The County objected to the
instruction, but the Court, citing Munson and other U.S. and English
cases employing the reasonable jury rule, found that the instruction
244
was proper. There is little in the reported case, however, revealing
whether there was evidence establishing the bank’s bona fide
purchaser status. The case report states that the County alleged in its
answer that the bank was not a bona fide purchaser, and that the bank
245
denied that allegation. The report’s description of the evidence is
minimal, but it appears that the Court applied the legal rule that a
bondholder who takes from a bona fide purchaser takes a valid title
even if the bondholder knew of the fraud at the time he acquired the
246
bonds.
Thus, this case appears to involve an application of law to
settled facts, and not a dispute of fact.
247
In Galloway, the Court also cited Ewing v. Goode, a lower court
opinion involving a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff
248
developed glaucoma following cataract surgery.
The plaintiff
claimed that the doctor had failed to monitor and treat her condition
properly, resulting in the loss of one eye and impaired vision in the
249
other.
Expert testimony established that glaucoma occasionally
follows cataract surgery, and that if it does, little can be done to treat

241

94 U.S. 278 (1876).
Id.at 282-84.
243
See id. at 281-83.
244
See id. at 284-85. In addition to Munson, the Court cited Pleasants v. Fant, Parks
v. Ross, Merchants’ Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. 604 (1870); Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. 197
(1869); Jewell v. Parr, 13 C.B. 909, 138 Eng. Rep. 1460 (1853); Toomey v. London,
Brighton, and South Coast Ry. Co., 3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (1857);
Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 El. & Bl. 232, 120 Eng. Rep. 86 (1857); Schuchardt v. Allen, 68
U.S. 359 (1863); and Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. 355 (1872). Most of these cases
are discussed elsewhere in this article.
245
See Commissioners, 94 U.S. at 282.
246
See id. at 284-86.
247
78 F. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1897).
248
Id.
249
Id. at 443.
242
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250

it. The expert witness also found nothing improper in the way the
251
defendant operated on the plaintiff or in his follow-up care.
Although there was some dispute over whether the defendant
adequately provided for the plaintiff’s care while the defendant was
out of town, the court found that there was no more than a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claims because the defendant
was already treating her for glaucoma during that period despite
252
scant evidence of the disease.
Thus, the court, relying heavily on
253
the expert testimony, directed a verdict for the defendant.
Ewing is different from the earlier cases and provides some
support for Galloway because the issue presented appears to be one
of fact: did the defendant doctor give the plaintiff proper care in
treating her eye? Two aspects of Ewing, however, tie it to the earlier
cases: first, the issue of negligence has some legal content; and
second, the facts on which the court based its opinion—especially the
fact that the doctor was already treating the plaintiff for glaucoma
when he went away—were undisputed. Although the evidence for
the plaintiff was scant, this case shows movement in the lower courts
254
toward more judicial decisions on issues of fact.
255
The Galloway Court also cited Southern Railway Co. v. Walters
256
and Gunning v. Cooley.
In Walters, the plaintiff, a child who had
been hit by a train and severely injured, sued the railway company
alleging that it negligently failed to stop the train and flag the
crossing as required by an order of the Illinois Commerce
257
Commission.
While this case concerned a fact dispute—whether
the train had stopped—it also posed an evidentiary question: whether
the court could justify excluding certain questionable testimony.
Witnesses disagreed over whether the train had stopped. Five
250

See id. at 446.
See id. at 448.
252
See id. at 448-50.
253
78 F. at 450.
254
Recent studies suggest that the lower courts are more eager to take cases away
from juries than is the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mollica, supra note 114; Schnapper,
supra note 114. This conclusion seems inconsistent with numerous studies
suggesting that judges generally think that juries do a good job. See, e.g., Prentice H.
Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
147 (1990); Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: Crisis of Confidence?, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 248 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Power, 56
TEX. L. REV. 47 (1977); Mark Curriden, Putting the Squeeze on Juries, 86 A.B.A. J. 52, 56
(2000).
255
284 U.S. 190 (1931).
256
281 U.S. 90 (1930).
257
Gunning, 284 U.S. at 191-92.
251
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witnesses testified that it had stopped, while two witnesses testified
that the train did not stop. The Court found, however, that the latter
witnesses were not in a position to see whether the train had
259
stopped.
Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiff’s evidence
“was so insubstantial and insufficient that it did not justify a
260
submission of that issue to the jury.”
In fact, the Court said that
“[t]here is no proof whatever that the alleged failure to stop before
entering the crossing was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
261
injury.”
262
Finally, the Galloway Court cited Gunning v. Cooley, a medical
malpractice case upholding a lower court’s refusal to direct a verdict
for the defendant. In Gunning, the plaintiff claimed that the doctor
263
had put acid in her ears, causing severe pain and loss of hearing.
The defendant testified to the contrary, and physical evidence
suggested that it was unlikely that acid had been applied to the
264
plaintiff’s ears. Nevertheless, the court viewed the issue as turning
on the credibility of the witnesses, and held that that was a question
265
In the course of reaching that conclusion, the Court
for the jury.
repeated the rules governing when a case can be taken from a jury,
including the rule requiring more than a scintilla of evidence before
266
a case may go to the jury. That language probably explains why the
Court in Galloway cited Gunning. Galloway had relied on Gunning in
arguing his cause to the Court, and his reliance was certainly
reasonable. If Galloway’s expert witness had been believed, there
would have been evidence of mental illness dating to Galloway’s
service in the war. However, the Court never gave a jury an
opportunity to consider the credibility of that expert.
Galloway also relied on two other decisions, each coming within
two years of the decision in his case and squarely on point. In both
cases, the Court found the evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the
question whether the claimant had been permanently and totally
disabled as of the date when his War Risk Insurance had expired. In
267
the earlier of the two, Berry v. United States, the plaintiff lost a leg
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

See Walters, 284 U.S. at 194.
See id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Id.
281 U.S. 90 (1930).
See id. at 95-97.
See id. at 97.
See id. at 97-98.
Id. at 94.
312 U.S. 450 (1941).
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during World War I and subsequently failed at numerous attempts to
hold gainful employment upon his return to the United States. The
Court found that the jury could have returned a verdict either way,
such that the trial judge had properly denied the Government’s
268
motion for directed verdict.
Additionally, the Court stated that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which governs directed
verdicts, “has not taken away from juries and given to judges any part
of the exclusive power of juries to weigh evidence and determine
contested issues of fact—a jury being the constitutional tribunal
269
provided for trying facts in courts of law.”
270
Galloway also relied on Halliday v. United States, another case
involving a claim under a War Risk Insurance policy. Halliday’s
271
disability, like Galloway’s, was mental. Halliday had refused to seek
hospitalization, but he presented evidence of mental incapacity
beginning during the life of his policy and continuing for fifteen
272
years. Although there was no gap in the evidence, the evidence in
Halliday was otherwise similar to that offered by Galloway. The gap in
Galloway, therefore, was clearly determinative.
In Galloway, the Court cited no authority on the demurrer to the
273
evidence that predated Munson other than Parks v. Ross. The Court
noted, however, that practice relating to the common law devices of
demurrer to the evidence and nonsuit was changing at the time of
274
the Seventh Amendment’s ratification.
Evidently the Court
thought that this meant that the practice was not so hardened as to
be an immutable part of the Seventh Amendment, but the cases the
Court cites as examples of that changing practice are revealing. As
for demurrer to the evidence, the Court cited two English cases and
invited a comparison between the two. The earlier of the two,
275
Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, addressed whether certain tradesmen were
exempt from taxes on goods sold in London through third parties.
The evidence showed that these tradesmen had been treated as
exempt for a long period of time, but the exemption required a legal
act, such as an Act of Parliament, in order to be given legal effect,
276
and there was no evidence of such an Act. The court noted that on
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

See id. at 453-56.
Id. at 453.
315 U.S. 94 (1942).
Id. at 96-99.
See id.
See Galloway, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
See id. at 391 & n.23.
1 Doug. 118, 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (1779).
Id.at 84.
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a demurrer to the evidence, “the defendant admits every fact which
277
the jury could have found upon the evidence.”
The court found
that the jury could have inferred that the practice of exempting the
tradesmen, which concededly dated to “time immemorial,” had been
supported initially by an Act of Parliament or other legal act that is
278
no longer part of the record.
The Court in Galloway invited a comparison between Cocksedge
279
and a later English case, Gibson v. Hunter, decided in 1793, and
therefore roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the
Seventh Amendment. In Gibson, which concerned an allegedly
fraudulent bill of exchange, there was some dispute over whether the
acceptor knew of the fraud. The court required the party demurring
to his opponent’s evidence to admit on the record the truth of the
280
evidence, which the demurring party had not done. The court also
found that the evidence was so uncertain that no judgment could be
281
given, and ordered a new trial.
As Galloway noted, comparison of
Cocksedge and Gibson suggests a change in the practice governing
demurrer to the evidence, but the change seems to make demurrer
to the evidence more difficult to sustain. Cocksedge, the earlier case,
allowed courts to draw all inferences that the jury could have drawn
from the evidence, but Gibson required the demurring party to admit
everything, including inferences, on the record before his demurrer
could be sustained. One commentator noted that this made the
device “cumbersome” so that “it fell into disuse soon after this
282
decision.” Thus, the nature of the shift in demurrer to the evidence
does not sustain Galloway’s apparent conclusion that changes in the
demurrer to the evidence in late eighteenth century England should
make it easier for judges to take cases from the jury.
The Court in Galloway also sought to illustrate the changing state
of the law by citing three state cases decided in the late 1700s and
early 1800s. None of these cases required the party demurring to
admit all the facts on the record; rather they allowed the judge to
draw inferences that the jury could have drawn against the demurring
283
party. In Patrick v. Hallett, a New York case, the question was
whether a ship that had suddenly sprung a leak and sunk was

277
278
279
280
281
282
283

Id. at 88.
Id. at 86-89.
2 H. Bl. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793).
Id. at 510.
Id.
Henderson, supra note 43, at 289, 304-05.
1 Johns. Rep. 241 (N.Y. 1806).
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seaworthy. If it was not, the insurers were relieved of liability. The
court held that if the evidence allowed any inference that the ship
was seaworthy, that inference was considered admitted by the
285
demurrer.
The court stated that this rule prevented judges from
286
becoming triers of fact.
The court then held that the sudden
springing of a leak alone is not evidence of unseaworthiness, and thus
287
The dissent, by contrast, would have
the shipowner prevailed.
applied a presumption that the sudden springing of a leak is prima
288
facie evidence of unseaworthiness.
The difference of opinion
between the majority and the dissent in Patrick concerned whether an
evidentiary presumption of unseaworthiness should apply based on
the sudden springing of a leak. The existence of a presumption, like
289
other evidentiary rulings, is a question of law for the judge.
The second state court case cited by Galloway that suggested a
290
change in demurrer to the evidence law was Stephens v. White, a legal
malpractice action. The question in Stephens was whether the
defendant was an attorney of record when the alleged malpractice
291
occurred.
The case contains the language that a demurrer to the
evidence “admits the truth of all facts which can be fairly, and
consequently inferred from the evidence, yet that inference must grow
292
necessarily out of the evidence.”
However, that language only
appears in the report of the parties’ arguments, not in the court’s
opinion. The court found no issue as to when the defendant attorney
293
was employed.
According to the court, the only indication in the
record that he was part of the proceedings occurred in 1784, more
than five years after the action originally commenced and long after
294
the alleged malpractice.
Thus, this might be seen as a case where
there was no evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position.
295
In Whittington v. Christian, the court noted a change in the
practice of demurrer to the evidence in Virginia. While Virginia had
at one time followed the English practice of requiring the party
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295

Id. at 241-45.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 246-47.
See id. at 247-49.
See THAYER, supra note 3, at 212.
2 Wash. 203, 1-2 Va. Rep. Ann. 709 (1796).
Id. at 203-09.
2 Wash. at 207.
Id. at 208.
See id. at 203-04, 208, 212-13.
2 Rand. 353, 23 Va. 353 (1824).
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demurring to admit all facts that the opposing party’s evidence
296
“conduced to prove,” the rule was now
to consider the demurrer, as if the demurrant had admitted all
that could reasonably be inferred by a jury, from the evidence
given by the other party, and waived all the evidence on his part,
which contradicts that offered by the other party, or the credit of
which is impeached; and all inferences from his own evidence,
297
which do not necessarily flow from it.

Thus, Whittington certainly supports Galloway’s statement that the law
was in flux early in the country’s history, but in no way suggests that
courts can weigh evidence as to disputed questions of fact. Instead,
the court is to put all the weight on the non-moving party’s side.
Even if Whittington suggested that the judge could weigh evidence, it
would have no bearing on the Seventh Amendment, which applies in
298
federal courts but not in state courts.
It is also interesting to consider a case that the Court in Galloway
299
did not cite, Pawling v. United States. The demurrer to the evidence
was in use early in the country’s history, but its use was quite different
from Galloway in the way it defined questions of fact and questions of
law. In Pawling, the issue was whether a bond had been delivered as
300
an escrow conditioned on others becoming sureties on the bond.
There was nothing on the face of the bond suggesting it was delivered
301
as an escrow. The Court found the evidence sufficient for a jury to
find for either party, but on the demurrer to the evidence the
judgment had to be for the party opposing the demurrer—in this
302
case, the defendants. The Court stated the rule as
[t]he party demurring admits the truth of the testimony to which
he demurs, and also those conclusions of fact which a jury may
fairly draw from that testimony. Forced and violent inferences he
does not admit; but the testimony is to be taken most strongly
against him, and such conclusions as a jury might justifiably draw,
303
the court ought to draw.
296

2 Rand. at 357. This is the rule stated in Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 126
Eng. Rep. 499 (1793). See supra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
297
Whittington, 2 Rand. at 357-58.
298
See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 216-18
(1916); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnahan, 86 S.E. 863, 864-66 (Va. 1915);
Austin W. Scott, Trial By Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669,
670-71 (1918).
299
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 219 (1808).
300
Id.
301
Id. at 222.
302
See id. at 223-24.
303
Id. at 221-22.
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This language suggests that the court can assess the reasonableness of
a decision for the demurring party, but also makes it plain that the
court must construe the evidence strongly against the demurring
party. This is, perhaps, the most significant shift between the
demurrer to the evidence as seen in Pawling and the directed verdict
as interpreted by Galloway, and it depends heavily on the Munson
decision’s adoption of the reasonable jury standard.
This review of the cases cited in Galloway suggests that Galloway
misapplied the precedent it purportedly relied on. Drawing on
Munson’s reasonable jury standard, itself of questionable lineage, the
Court in Galloway permitted a directed verdict to be entered on a
disputed question of pure fact, when none of the authority it cited
had gone so far.
C. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict: Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman
304

Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman predated the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by three years, and, therefore, did not use
the term “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” but the Federal
Rules codified the approach adopted in Redman. The appellate court
in Redman found that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for
the plaintiff was insufficient, and ordered a new trial, believing that it
could not order judgment for the defendant because of the Court’s
decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Company. In Slocum, the
Court held that a court could not enter a judgment inconsistent with
the jury’s verdict because to do so would violate the Reexamination
305
Clause of the Seventh Amendment. Thus, the Court was limited to
ordering a new trial, which was the practice at common law. By
constrast, the Supreme Court in Redman noted that the trial judge in
that case, unlike the trial judge in Slocum, had explicitly reserved
306
judgment on the sufficiency of the evidence.
This, the Court
found, was consistent with a well-established eighteenth century
practice of taking a jury’s verdict subject to the court’s opinion on a
307
reserved question of law. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still
follow the practice of reserving decisions on the sufficiency of
308
evidence, and its constitutionality is considered settled.
304

295 U.S. 654 (1935).
Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 423-24 (1913).
306
Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
307
Id. at 656-57.
308
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (providing that when a judge denies a motion for
judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury, “the court is
considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later
305
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Once again, however, the cases cited in Redman fail to support its
decision. The Supreme Court in Redman did not describe the facts of
309
the case at all.
Indeed, the Court granted certiorari only on the
question whether the court of appeals correctly held that it could not
order a judgment to be entered for the defendant; it denied
certiorari on the question whether the evidence in support of the
310
plaintiff’s verdict was sufficient.
The court of appeals set out the
facts of the case in detail, however, and they tell a story considerably
311
more complicated than the Supreme Court’s decision suggests.
The plaintiff was a ship’s cook who suffered gangrene in his left
312
foot, which required amputation of the lower third of his leg. He
testified that he stepped on a box slat that had a nail in it while on his
way to work in the galley at 5:00 a.m. He stated that there was no
light on the deck, which was littered with debris. He washed the foot
with hot water, and went to work, but the next day, the foot was
swollen and painful. The plaintiff testified that he told the chief
steward about the injury. The plaintiff then went ashore, procured
some medication for the foot, spent the night ashore, and missed the
ship’s sailing the next day. The foot continued to get worse until,
almost two weeks after the initial injury, he was taken to the hospital
by ambulance, where he was diagnosed with gangrene. Doctors
amputated the leg nearly two months later. Plaintiff claimed that
313
gangrene resulted from the initial injury.
The court of appeals, however, recited a litany of evidence that
contradicted the plaintiff’s story. The chief steward denied that the
plaintiff told him about the injury. Doctors who treated the plaintiff
at the hospital testified that he did not tell them about the injury
314
from the nail. The plaintiff also did not tell a medical examiner for
315
his employer, who determined that he was fit to sail with the ship.
The plaintiff filed a claim with his company, but the written
statement, taken down by an agent, was inconsistent with his
316
testimony, and never mentioned the nail.
The hospital doctors
deciding the legal questions raised by the motion”). It is well established that one
cannot move for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict if one has failed to
move for judgment as a matter of law before the case was submitted to the jury. See
MILLAR, supra note 43, at 330-35.
309
See Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
310
See id.
311
See Redman v. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 70 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1934).
312
Id. at 636-37.
313
Id. at 636.
314
Id.
315
Id. at 637.
316
Redman, 70 F.2d at 637.
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testified that the plaintiff suffered from “dry” gangrene, which could
317
not result from an injury such as he described. One doctor testified
that gangrene could result from an injury like the one alleged by
plaintiff, but that doctor did not take account of the diagnosis of
318
“dry” gangrene.
A dissent in the case, however, gives a somewhat different view of
the facts. The dissent noted that the plaintiff’s testimony about
stepping on the nail was uncontradicted and that the chief steward,
who denied having been told about it, had apparently offered his
319
testimony to the highest bidder.
The dissent also noted that the
plaintiff might not have mentioned the foot to the ship’s doctor
320
because that doctor was on board to check for venereal disease.
Furthermore, the doctor who first examined the plaintiff at the
hospital did not speak English well, and resented any questions about
321
his professional ability.
The dissent suggested that the plaintiff’s
subsequent failure to inform other doctors about the nail could be
attributed to the initial doctor’s dismissal of the information. The
dissent also found conflicting medical testimony about whether a
322
wound such as the plaintiff reported could cause “dry” gangrene.
In addition, the dissent noted that the doctors who testified that the
plaintiff had not suffered an infection in his foot had not seen the
323
plaintiff until after gangrene had set in.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict and for a dismissal
of the complaint, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to
324
support a verdict for the plaintiff. The judge reserved his decision
325
Based on the
on the two motions, and sent the case to the jury.
evidence presented in court, the jury found for the plaintiff and
326
awarded him $5000.
The trial judge, ruling on the reserved
motions, then decided that the evidence was sufficient to support the
327
verdict and entered judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant
appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
317

Id. at 638.
Id. The court of appeals also noted at the outset of the opinion that the
plaintiff was “a colored seaman.” Id. at 636. One wonders whether this influenced
the court, as it discounted most of what the plaintiff said.
319
Id. at 638-39.
320
Id.
321
Redman, 70 F.2d at 638-39.
322
Id.
323
Id. at 638.
324
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935).
325
Id.
326
See Redman, 70 F.2d at 637.
327
Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
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Second Circuit, which, in a two to one decision, produced the two
328
very different views of the evidence described above. Thus, by the
time the case got to the Supreme Court, four judges had considered
the sufficiency of the evidence, with two believing that the evidence
was sufficient, and two believing that it was not. In spite of this
329
conflict, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue.
The state of the “facts” in Redman is particularly telling in light of
the authority cited for the Court’s position that the trial judge can
enter judgment for the verdict loser if he has explicitly reserved
decision on the sufficiency of the evidence. In support of this
position, the Court first noted that the Seventh Amendment
preserves the right to a jury trial, “which existed under English
330
common law when the amendment was adopted.” The Court later
said that “[a]t common law there was a well-established practice of
reserving questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking
331
verdicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved.”
There certainly was such a common law practice, commonly
called the “case reserved,” but the cases that the Redman Court cited
332
suggest that the Court misused the “case reserved” concept.
For
333
example, the Court cited Carleton v. Griffin, an English case from
1758 in which a testator had written a will without the required
formalities. The testator subsequently added a codicil, which
conformed to the requirements and acknowledged that the original
334
informal will was his.
The plaintiff, the testator’s heir at law,
claimed certain properties the testator left to his wife and daughter
335
The jury returned a verdict for the
under the informal will.
plaintiff, but two questions were “reserved for the opinion of [the]
336
Court”: first, whether the republication of the first will by means of
the codicil constituted a republication under the Statute of Frauds;
and, second, whether the first will had left a freehold interest to
337
either the daughter or her mother.
The court answered both
338
questions in favor of the daughter. The justices interpreted the first
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

Redman, 70 F.2d at 637.
Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 659.
See Henderson, supra note 43, at 305-07.
97 Eng. Rep. 443 (1758).
Id.
Id.at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 445-47.
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will and the codicil as a single instrument, and then held that the will
339
clearly devised the property to the daughter. Therefore, the court
granted judgment for the daughter even though she had lost the jury
verdict.
In contrast to Redman, there was no dispute about the facts in
Carleton because they were written plainly in the will. The only
question was the effect given to those facts. Thus, the case is
consistent with two rules followed by English courts at the time. The
first is that juries are to decide only disputed facts, and if the facts are
340
not disputed, the court decides the application of law to the facts.
341
The second is that judges, not juries, interpret written documents.
Unlike the wills in Carleton, the evidence in Redman consisted largely
of testimony—testimony that was quite inconsistent. In other words,
it is much easier to classify the questions at issue in Carleton as
questions of law than the questions at issue in Redman.
The other cases cited by the Court in Redman, which all
concerned reserved questions of law, are similar to Carleton.
342
Coppendale v. Bridgen involved an action against a sheriff for a false
343
A man named
return on an execution. The facts were clear.
Debonaire was arrested for a debt and remained in prison for over
two months. He was released pursuant to his adjudication as a
bankrupt. While the return on the execution was due during
Debonaire’s two months in prison, the sheriff did not actually return
it until four months after Debonaire’s release. At that time, the
sheriff returned it “nulla bona.” But the question was whether the
sheriff, who had levied on Debonaire’s small amount of property,
should have turned it over to the plaintiff, who had sought the
execution. Plaintiff alleged that on the due date, the sheriff could
not have known that Debonaire would be adjudged a bankrupt
because that adjudication was based on his being imprisoned for two
344
months, which had not yet elapsed. By the time the sheriff actually
returned the writ, Debonaire was clearly bankrupt. The court noted
that the statute provides that a debtor who is imprisoned for two
months is presumed to have been bankrupt upon his incarceration.
Thus, the sheriff’s return was proper. Debonaire was, in fact,
bankrupt on the original return date because of this relation back

339
340
341
342
343
344

Id. at 445-47. All three justices expressed opinions, but they were unanimous.
See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 240.
See THAYER, supra note 3, at 203-06; see also supra note 38.
2 Burr. 814, 97 Eng. Rep. 576 (1759).
The facts are set out at Coppendale, 97 Eng. Rep.at 576-77.
Id. at 577-79.
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provision. Indeed, the plaintiff would have gained nothing had the
sheriff returned the writ on the due date, because the plaintiff would
346
have been required to turn the goods over to the debtor’s assignees.
This case, like Carleton, seems to be a clear question of law as it
concerns the interpretation of a statute and its application to
undisputed facts.
347
The Redman Court next cited Bird v. Randall, a case in which
the plaintiff obtained a verdict subject to the opinion of the court on
a reserved question of law. The question was whether a plaintiff who
had recovered damages for breach of contract could also recover
348
damages against the person who had allegedly induced the breach.
The plaintiff filed the second suit after he obtained a judgment in the
349
first, but before recovering that judgment.
The court noted that
the plaintiff could not maintain a suit against the person who had
induced the breach if the first judgment was paid before the second
350
suit commenced. The court held that the result should be the same
where the plaintiff has recovered from the first defendant before the
351
There is nothing in this case that looks
second suit is tried.
remotely like a question of fact.
352
The Court next cited Price v. Neal.
In Price, the question
reserved was whether a person who paid forged notes could recover
353
the value from the innocent person to whom they had been paid.
Plaintiff’s counsel noted that it would be impossible to recover from
the drawer because no drawer existed, nor from the forger, because
354
he had been hanged for forgery. Although the jury found for the
plaintiff, the court held that because the defendant had given value
for the payments in good faith, with no suspicion of forgery, he was
355
not required to pay the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff had
the burden of ascertaining the genuineness of the notes. Once
again, there was no question about the facts; the only question was
the clearly legal question about the rights of a bona fide purchaser
for value.
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355

Id. at 478.
Id. at 579.
97 Eng. Rep. 866 (1762).
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 869-70.
Id. at 870-71.
97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872.
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The Redman Court next cited Basset v. Thomas, in which the
reserved question was whether a lease was valid. The court held that
the lease was valid, in large part based on the meaning of words used
357
in the document. In this respect, Basset is consistent with the rule
that documents are interpreted by the judge, not the jury. In
358
addition, none of the evidence in Basset was in dispute, so the
court’s holding is consistent with the rule that the judge can decide
the legal effect of undisputed facts.
The last eighteenth-century English case that the Redman Court
359
relied on was Timmons v. Rowlinson. The reserved issue was whether
the plaintiff was liable for double rent for a half year after he had
given notice of his intent to vacate the premises, but had failed to
360
leave. The lease and the notice of intent to vacate were both oral.
Accordingly, the questions were, first, whether a statute that allowed
double rent for holding over after giving notice governed oral leases,
and, second, whether the statute governed leases for a period as short
361
as a year.
These are clearly questions of statutory construction—
questions of law—and the court decided them, finding the statute
362
applicable.
In short, the Redman Court relied on eighteenth century English
cases where the questions reserved significantly differed from the
question at issue in Redman. The earlier cases involved applications
of law to fact, interpretations of the legal language used in
documents, and constructions of statutes. In Redman, by contrast,
there was conflicting evidence on whether the defendant’s
363
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury.
The Redman Court,
however, ignored that conflicting evidence and chose not to
reconsider the lower court’s two to one decision that the evidence
364
was so one-sided as to render the factual dispute a question of law.
In addition to these cases, Redman also cited a number of
treatises. While most merely mention the rule governing the case
365
reserved, Thayer’s evidence treatise is more illuminating. Thayer
356

97 Eng. Rep. 916 (1763).
Id. at 919.
358
Id. at 916-20.
359
97 Eng. Rep. 1003 (1765).
360
Id. at 1003-04.
361
Id. at 1004-05.
362
Id. at 1005-07.
363
See Redman, 70 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1934).
364
See Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
365
See, e.g., 1 JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING’S
BENCH IN PERSONAL ACTIONS AND EJECTMENT 188, 192 (1823); THOMAS STARKIE, A
357
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says little about the practice of reserving questions on his own
366
account, but he does report at length on what Lord Blackburn said
367
about the practice in the late 1800s. This report is not particularly
relevant to English practice in the late 1700s, as the law can change
dramatically in a hundred years. If the Court, however, had reviewed
368
Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Co. v. Slattery, the case cited in
Thayer’s treatise, it would have found that Lord Blackburn was a
dissenter in that case, and that the majority made it clear that when
369
evidence is in dispute, the question is for the jury. The Dublin case
concerned a railroad accident in which a train hit and killed a man
370
while he was crossing the tracks at a station.
The plaintiff alleged
that the railroad’s engineer negligently failed to blow the train’s
371
The defendant claimed that the decedent was
whistle.
contributorily negligent in failing to take adequate precautions when
372
crossing the track. A jury found for the plaintiff, who was the widow
of the deceased, but the railroad contended that there was no
evidence of its own negligence but ample evidence showing that the
373
deceased was contributorily negligent.
Finding that evidence
existed in plaintiff’s favor on both counts, the majority allowed the
374
verdict to stand even though the evidence was weak. In particular,
there was some question about whether the train’s engineer had
375
More importantly, while there was
actually blown the whistle.
evidence suggesting that the deceased might have seen the train
coming if he had exercised care, crossing the tracks was necessary in
order to buy a ticket, and the deceased crossed at a spot that had

PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 808-09 (10th Am. ed. 1876); WILLIAM
TIDD, THE NEW PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND
EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS IN PERSONAL ACTIONS AND EJECTMENT 539 (1837). The Court
also cited WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH AND COMMON
PLEAS IN PERSONAL ACTIONS AND EJECTMENT 900 (4th Am. ed. 1856). The Third
American Edition of that treatise contains the same reference to the case reserved at
page 900, without elaboration but with a number of citations. 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE
PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS IN PERSONAL ACTIONS
AND EJECTMENT (Robert H. Small ed., 3d Am. ed. 1840).
366
See THAYER, supra note 3, at 241 & n.1.
367
See id. at n.1.
368
3 App. Cas. 1155 (1878).
369
See id. Thayer referred to Lord Blackburn’s remarks in another case as well,
but cites only the London Times. See THAYER, supra note 3, at 241 n.1.
370
See Dublin, 3 App. Cas. at 1155.
371
Id. at 1155-56.
372
Id.
373
Id. at 1155, 1159.
374
Id.
375
See Dublin, 3 App. Cas. at 1158-59.
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376

become customary for making the crossing.
In light of this
uncertainty as to the facts, the case stands for the traditional rule in
377
England that the jury decides any factual disputes.
The Redman Court also referred to three later English cases in
support of the practice of reserving questions of law. The first,
378
Treacher v. Hinton, did not involve the case reserved, but rather a
procedure more akin to a directed verdict. In Treacher, the acceptor
of a bill of exchange was sued by the plaintiff-indorsee after the bank
379
refused payment.
The plaintiff failed to prove that he had given
notice of non-payment to the defendant acceptor. The court
nonsuited the plaintiff, with leave for the plaintiff to seek a judgment
380
based on a question of law.
The question of law was whether the
acceptance had the legal effect of requiring the acceptor to pay
regardless of whether he was given notice of the bank’s non381
payment. The court answered this legal question in the affirmative
382
and ordered judgment for the plaintiff.
Interestingly, two of the
judges, in answering the question whether the court could enter
judgment for the plaintiff, as opposed to nonsuiting him, employed a
legal fiction: because the trial judge had nonsuited the plaintiff and
given him leave to move for a judgment in the hearing of the jury,
383
the jury was presumed to have consented to the judgment. More
to the point, there was no dispute about what happened in the case;
the only existing dispute was the legal effect of the facts.
384
385
The Court also cited Jewell v. Parr and Ryder v. Wombwell, both
386
of which had been relied on in Improvement Co. v. Munson in
387
Neither of those cases,
support of the reasonable jury standard.
however, supports the outcome in Redman. As I have noted, Jewell
concerned the question whether an acceptor of a bill of exchange
376

See id. at 1157.
The question in Dublin might also be viewed as a mixed question of fact and
law, though one where the jury was allowed to decide the matter. The question of
the duty of the railroad to passengers who had to make a dangerous crossing
certainly has an element of law in it.
378
106 Eng. Rep. 988 (1821).
379
Id.
380
See Treacher, 106 Eng. Rep. at 988.
381
Id. at 989-90.
382
Id.
383
Id.
384
138 Eng. Rep. 1460 (1853).
385
4 L.R. Ex. 32 (1868).
386
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871).
387
See id. at 448; see also the cases discussed supra notes 119-184 and accompanying
text.
377
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could escape liability by testifying that the bill had been paid by the
388
drawer.
The court, relying largely on the rule that an acceptor in
such circumstances is generally liable to the holder but has recourse
against the drawer, did not allow the jury verdict in favor of the
acceptor to stand, even though the jury could have believed the
389
Thus, the Jewell ruling was more legal than
acceptor’s testimony.
factual.
Similarly, the court in Ryder relied largely on a legal rule: one
who seeks to establish that jewels and other luxury items are
“necessaries” so as to overcome the defense of minority in a breach of
contract action must produce an affirmative evidence showing that
390
the goods are necessary to the person’s station in life. Thus, Ryder
was a case where there was no evidence for the plaintiff on the
disputed question. Neither case is anything like Redman, where there
was a substantial dispute as to a pure question of fact.
The Court in Redman noted that some of its own earlier cases
had approved of the case reserved. The earliest was the 1809 case,
391
Brent v. Chapman, which addressed whether ownership of a slave
392
Creditors of
had passed from the estate of the father to his son.
393
both the father and the son claimed the slave. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, a creditor of the son, subject to the opinion
394
of the court on an agreed set of facts. The Court found that, while
not formally administered, the father’s estate provided for transfer of
the slave to the son because of the assent of an executor who was
395
competent to assent to the division of property.
Thus, the court
396
held that the slave was the property of the son. The legal effect of
an executor’s assent seems primarily a question of law. Thus, this
case is consistent with the early English cases in that the facts are
undisputed, and only their legal effect was at issue, and the case
differs from Redman.
397
Another case relied on by Redman, Chinoweth v. Haskell, also
presented a distinct question of law. This case was an ejectment
388

Id. at 1462.
Jewell, 138 Eng. Rep. at 1463.
390
Ryder, 4 L.R. Ex. at 38.
391
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 358 (1809).
392
Id.
393
Id. at 358-60.
394
Id. at 361.
395
Id. The opinion, by Chief Justice Marshall, was only two paragraphs long and
cited no authority. See id.
396
Id.
397
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 92 (1830).
389
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action in which a land grant was inconsistent with a survey.
The
plaintiff’s survey encompassed land that the defendants occupied, but
399
the defendants argued that the grant did not include this land.
The defendants demurred to the evidence, and the jury returned a
400
verdict for the plaintiff subject to a ruling on the demurrer.
The
Court found that the grant prevailed largely because the sloppily
401
performed survey conformed neither to the courses and distances
in the grant, nor to the general description of the property in the
402
grant. On its face, this appears to be a case where evidence was in
dispute and the Court decided it inconsistently with the jury verdict.
It can also be read, however, as turning largely on the Court’s
interpretation of documents, which in eighteenth century England,
was a job for the judge. Indeed, the Court notes that “neither the
grant nor the face of the plat furnishes any information by which the
403
corner called for in the grant can be controlled.” In other words,
the plaintiff presented no evidence to support his position that the
survey should prevail over the grant.
404
Finally, the Redman Court cited Suydam v. Williamson, an
ejectment action that turned entirely on the procedural niceties of
the method of appeal. The Court in Suydam mentioned the practice
405
of the case reserved, but found that the lower court had not taken
406
proper steps to reserve questions of law. Indeed, the Court found
that that the trial court had used no recognized method of
questioning the judgment and it affirmed judgment for the
407
plaintiffs.
Thus, while the Supreme Court acknowledged the case
reserved procedure during the early to mid-nineteenth century, its
practice was generally consistent with English practice.
This survey of cases reveals that Redman, like Munson, read far
too much into the cases upon which it relied. While English
398

Id.
Id. at 92-95.
400
Id. at 96.
401
See id. at 94-96. The surveyor made the original disputed line in his office, and
did not have an axeman to mark trees or a chain to measure distances when he went
to the land. The markers he was looking for were trees, and they were largely
indistinguishable from other trees in the area. In addition, the surveyor was looking
for a corner of property previously surveyed, but the the grant did not describe the
corner with reference to previous surveys.
402
See id. at 96-98.
403
Chinoweth, 28 U.S. (3. Pet.) at 98.
404
61 U.S. (20 How.) 427 (1857).
405
See id. at 434.
406
Id. at 434-35.
407
Id. at 431-42.
399
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common law practice had a procedure whereby jury verdicts could be
taken subject to later decisions by the court on questions of law, the
reserved questions in the English cases really were questions of law.
Eighteenth century English judges surely would be surprised to see
Redman decided by the court as if no dispute of fact existed. By
incorporating the reasonable jury standard enunciated in Munson,
the Redman Court treated disputed facts as law. Under this approach,
judges can decide matters that juries would have decided in 1791.
D. Summary Judgment: The Trilogy
The summary judgment has much more recent origins than
either the directed verdict or the judgment notwithstanding the
408
verdict.
In both England and the United States, summary
proceedings were unknown until the middle of the nineteenth
409
century.
Even then, they were restricted to specific kinds of
410
proceedings, and generally favored plaintiffs. Specifically, summary
proceedings were designed to help commercial plaintiffs get quick
411
relief against defaulting debtors.
Nevertheless, the theory behind
summary judgment is similar to the rationale for various procedures
and doctrines that were well-established in the common law at the
time of the Seventh Amendment’s ratification.
For example, the theory behind the demurrer to the evidence,
412
as stated in Gibson v. Hunter, was that while the jury decides the facts
and the judge decides the law, the usual practice was for the judge to
instruct the jury and then for the jury to “compound their verdict of
413
the law and fact.”
The demurrer to the evidence was a way for a
414
party to withdraw the decision as to the law from the jury. Summary
judgment, which allows the judge to apply the law to undisputed
facts, similarly withdraws the legal aspects of the case from the jury.
In 1902, the Supreme Court approved an early form of summary
415
judgment in Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland v. United States.
Indeed, this is the only Supreme Court case that has considered the
416
constitutionality of any form of summary judgment.
At issue in
408

See SWARD, supra note 2, at 275-87.
See id. at 277-78.
410
See id. at 275; see also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3d, § 2711 (1998).
411
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 410.
412
126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793).
413
Id. at 508-09.
414
Id. at 509.
415
187 U.S. 315 (1902).
416
See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 410, at § 2714 (discussing whether summary
409
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Fidelity was a court rule providing that in contract actions, a plaintiff
could file an affidavit along with his complaint, setting out his case
and arguing that he would be entitled to judgment unless the
defendant filed his own affidavit setting out his case and showing a
417
proper defense to the action. The defendant in Fidelity, an alleged
surety on several contracts, filed an affidavit denying knowledge of
the contracts it was supposed to have secured and demanded a trial
418
by jury.
Apparently believing that the affidavit was insufficient to
state a defense, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiff, the
419
The Supreme Court held that this rule did not
United States.
deprive the defendant of his right to jury trial, as it provided a means
420
by which the defendant could raise an issue triable to a jury. As the
defendant had failed to state facts that could defeat the plaintiff’s
421
claim, the Court upheld the judgment against the defendant.
Modern summary judgment procedure is similar, in that it allows the
party opposing summary judgment to raise issues of fact, thus
422
requiring a trial by jury if properly demanded.
Modern summary judgment procedure began with the
enactment of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It
allows the court to grant summary judgment for either the plaintiff or
the defendant if she establishes that “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
423
a matter of law.” To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the party
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the . . . party’s pleading, but the . . . party’s
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
424
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
This means that the party must produce evidence that would be
425
admissible at trial.
When hearing motions for summary judgment, courts
traditionally have been protective of the right to a jury trial, taking
care to give the case to the jury when issues of fact, including issues of

judgment violates the Seventh Amendment).
417
Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 316.
418
Id. at 317-18.
419
Id. at 322-23.
420
Id. at 320.
421
Id. at 321-22.
422
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
423
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
424
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
425
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 410, at § 2721.
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426

credibility, are raised.
But in 1986, the Supreme Court decided
three cases, commonly referred to as “the trilogy,” that made it easier
427
for courts to grant motions for summary judgment. In Celotex Corp.
428
v. Catrett, the Court held that summary judgment would be proper
where the moving party shows that the non-moving party has no
evidence on an essential element of her claim or defense and the
429
non-moving party has the burden of proof on that issue.
It is not
necessary for the moving party to produce affirmative evidence that
430
there is no factual support for her opponent’s claim. While this was
not a significant departure from the general practice at that time, the
Court in Celotex encouraged lower courts to make greater use of
summary judgment, noting that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
431
every action.’”
In other words, courts should not be reluctant to
use the device.
The Court made it easier for the lower courts to grant summary
judgment in two other cases decided that same term. In Anderson v.
432
Liberty Lobby, the Court first made it clear that in evaluating motions
for summary judgment, courts should apply the reasonable jury
433
standard.
The Court then said that courts should take account of
heightened standards of proof when deciding summary judgment
434
Specifically, when the standard of proof on an issue is
motions.
“clear and convincing evidence” rather than “a preponderance of the
evidence,” the question that the court must answer is whether a
reasonable jury could find that there was clear and convincing
426

See id. § 2714.
For critiques of the trilogy, see Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers to Cross:
Rule 50 Practice in the Modern Era of Summary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689
(1996); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment
on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1988);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988).
428
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
429
Id. at 317-18.
430
See id. at 323.
431
Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1.)
432
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
433
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. The Court also said this in Matsushita, which
was decided the same day. See Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986). The Court had, however, used the reasonable jury standard for summary
judgment decisions in earlier cases. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984).
434
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
427
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evidence for the non-moving party’s claim or defense.
In other
words, Anderson mandates that judges do some initial weighing of
evidence in deciding summary judgment motions; it allows judges to
put their thumbs on the scale. This decision provoked a strong
dissent from Justice Brennan who could not “square the direction
that the judge ‘is not himself to weigh the evidence’ with the
direction that the judge also bear in mind the ‘quantum’ of proof
required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient ‘caliber
436
or quantity’ to meet that ‘quantum.’”
437
Finally, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
the Court held that summary judgment was proper in an antitrust
case where the alleged motive to engage in a predatory pricing
conspiracy was unreasonable. The alleged conspiracy was to maintain
artificially high prices in Japan for various consumer electronic
products, while maintaining artificially low prices in the United States
for the purpose of driving American manufacturers out of the
438
market.
At the time of the Court’s decision, the conspiracy
439
allegedly had been going on for as long as thirty years. The Court
found that evidence of high prices in Japan was irrelevant to the
alleged conspiracy to charge artificially low prices in the United
States, even though that mechanism allegedly allowed the conspiracy
440
to continue.
The Court reasoned that “[l]ack of motive bears on
the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from
ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive
to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference
441
of conspiracy.” The Court found that the Japanese manufacturers
had no rational motive to engage in a predatory pricing conspiracy
because: (1) the American manufacturers were larger and better
established; (2) the alleged conspiracy had been going on for at least
twenty years with no appreciable effect; and (3) there is no guarantee
435

See id. The issue in Anderson was whether an allegedly libelous article was
produced with “actual malice.” Actual malice must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence when the plaintiff in a libel action is a public figure, according to New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964).
436
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
437
475 U.S. 574 (1986). Matsushita was the first of the three cases in this line of
cases, decided three months before Celotex and Anderson.
438
Id. at 578.
439
See id. at 578, 591 n.13. The Supreme Court’s decision was in 1986. The suit
was commenced in 1974, see id. at 577, and the conspiracy allegedly began as early as
1953, though it could have been as late as 1960. See id. at 591 n.13.
440
See id. at 595-96.
441
Matsushita, at 596-97.
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that the alleged conspirators could recoup the losses they suffered
442
while maintaining artificially low prices in the American market. In
the absence of a rational motive, the Court found the evidence
443
insufficient to permit a jury to infer a predatory pricing conspiracy.
To some extent, Matsushita may be an artifact of antitrust law,
which does not permit the jury to infer conspiracies if the evidence is
444
equally capable of supporting legal competitive behavior. In other
445
words, there is a heightened standard of proof in antitrust cases.
That rule in itself, however, is arguably inconsistent with the
historical allocation of fact-finding—including the drawing of
446
inferences—to the jury.
The Court has held that the Seventh
447
Amendment fully applies to statutory actions, including antitrust
actions.
Indeed, four justices dissented in Matsushita, and accused the
majority of mandating that a judge considering a summary judgment
motion in an antitrust case “should go beyond the traditional
summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the
448
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.” The dissent accused the
majority of ignoring a substantial and significant report of an expert
witness, and of preferring “its own economic theorizing to [the
449
expert’s].”
The expert witness’s report, if believed, supported not
only the existence of the alleged conspiracy, but also a reasonable
450
motive for it.
The three cases in the “trilogy”—Celotex, Anderson, and
Matsushita—permit judges to take cases away from juries under
442

See id. at 597.
Id. at 574-75.
444
See Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 759-60 n.6, 763-64 (1984).
445
See Mollica, supra note 114, at 154 and n.81 (citing cases).
446
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 406-11 (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also Brockbank v. Anderson, 135 Eng. Rep. 124, 131 (1844); Wright v.
Pindar, 82 Eng. Rep. 892 (1681); FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 222; THAYER, supra note 3,
at 194.
447
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974); see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d
1021, 1024-31 (9th Cir. 1973). It could be argued that Congress can change the law
by imposing a heightened standard of proof, especially for causes of action that it
creates. Cf., e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-90 (1990) (finding that
Congress had lowered the standard of proof for exceptions to discharge in
bankruptcy).
448
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 600 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens. See id.
449
Id. at 603.
450
See id. at 601-03, 606.
443
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conditions unlike anything seen in eighteenth century England.
While judges in eighteenth century England could decide the
application of law to fact—the theory behind summary judgment—
they did so only when the facts were undisputed. Current summary
judgment jurisprudence allows judges to make dispositive
determinations of fact under the guise of the reasonable jury
standard. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that judges have
used the Supreme Court’s permission from the trilogy to do just that.
A recent study that compared appellate cases decided in 1973
with cases decided in 1997-98 found that “certain inquiries deemed
factual in 1973—especially indeterminate legal standards such as state
of mind or reasonableness—transmuted into questions of law by the
451
end of the study period.” That study found that judges “demanded
more rigorous proof to rebut a Rule 56 [summary judgment]
452
motion” in the later years. Other studies have found an increase in
the number of summary judgments granted since the trilogy,
453
especially for defendants.
An examination of these studies’ data
and the cases analyzed in these studies reveal judges deciding
disputed questions of fact—something judges were less willing to do
454
prior to the trilogy.
E. The Linkage of Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, and Summary Judgment
Directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
summary judgment all trace their origins to a hodgepodge of
common law procedures that were designed, in part, to police the
law/fact distinction. Thus, demurrer to the evidence, precursor to
the directed verdict, amounted to an argument that the opposing
party had failed to produce evidence on a critical element of her
claim. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict traces to the case
reserved, by which the judges allowed the jury to proceed to a verdict
while reserving a question of law for later decision. Summary
judgment has no clear procedural ancestor, but the general common
law rule that judges could decide the application of law to undisputed
451

Mollica, supra note 114, at 142.
Id.
453
See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 91-93 (1990); see also Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts
and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA
Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208 (1993).
454
See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 453, at 91; see also International
Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority decided questions of fact).
452
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facts reflects the same principle.
From these distinct but related beginnings, the three procedures
are now clearly linked under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court itself has linked summary judgment and directed
verdict in its holding that the directed verdict standard (the
456
reasonable jury standard) applies to summary judgment.
If
summary judgment traces to the common law rule that judges could
decide the application of law to undisputed facts, this linkage effects
an expansion of summary judgment: the reasonable jury standard
allows judges to make some determinations of disputed facts on the
theory that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute only one way.
In 1991, changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
completed the linkage by eliminating the terms “directed verdict”
and “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” and substituting
“judgment as a matter of law” for both. The Advisory Committee’s
notes to the 1991 amendment to Rule 50 describe the rationale for
the change:
The term “judgment as a matter of law” is . . . [a] familiar term
and appears in the text of Rule 56 [governing summary
judgment]; its use in Rule 50 [governing what used to be termed
directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict] calls
attention to the relationship between the two rules. Finally, the
change enables the rule to refer to preverdict and post-verdict
motions with a terminology that does not conceal the common
identity of two motions made at different times in the
457
proceeding.

Thus, the three motions are described as identical but for the timing.
And if they are identical, the same standard—the reasonable jury
standard—must apply to all of them. If this was not clear to everyone
before the 1991 amendments, it surely must be after.
The reasonable jury standard is critical to this linkage. Under
the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause no fact found by a
jury can be reexamined other than according to the rules of the
458
common law.
With the development of the reasonable jury
standard, judges became more willing to take cases away from the
jury prior to the verdict by means of a directed verdict. Judges
455

See supra notes 408-22 and accompanying text. There were numerous nowextinct common-law procedures that reflected this principle. See Henderson, supra
note 43, at 300-16 (discussing case reserved, demurrer to the evidence, and the old
j.n.o.v.).
456
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
457
FED. R. CIV. P. 50 adv. comm. notes (1991 amendment).
458
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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remained reluctant, however, to apply the reasonable jury standard to
post-verdict motions because of the Reexamination Clause. Redman
resolved their doubts by allowing a post-verdict judgment
notwithstanding the verdict if the judge had reserved decision on a
459
motion for directed verdict.
Eventually, Rule 50 provided that a
judge who denied a motion for directed verdict was deemed to have
460
reserved the question until after the verdict. This fiction continues
to this day, as Rule 50 still permits a post-verdict motion for judgment
as a matter of law (to use modern terminology) only if such a motion
461
is made prior to a verdict.
On the one hand, the Rule 50 fiction seems unnecessary. As I
have shown, the development of the reasonable jury standard has
transformed what were once questions of fact for the jury into
questions of law for the judge. If the court rules that no reasonable
jury could have found for the verdict winner as a matter of law, then
the court is not reexamining facts found by the jury. On the other
hand, courts remain uncomfortable with this approach, clinging to
the fiction that they are not reexamining facts, but delaying a
decision on a pre-verdict motion. Framing judges’ role this way links
the procedure to the common law, even if the substance reflected in
those common law procedures differs vastly from the substance
reflected in their modern counterparts. This procedural scheme,
however, clearly allows—and even encourages—judges to tread
heavily on the jury’s territory, while hiding behind legal fiction.
This examination of the cases that the Court has relied on in
orchestrating the transformation of fact into law reveals several
things. First, the reasonable jury standard on which the entire
symphony depends was not developed in England until the middle of
the nineteenth century, sixty years after ratification of the Seventh
Amendment—and did not make its way into Supreme Court
jurisprudence until nearly twenty years after that. Second, demurrers
to the evidence, which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence,
were generally directed at a complete lack of evidence, at
inadmissible evidence, or—and this was a later development—at
evidence relating to mixed questions of law and fact. Third,
eighteenth century English cases employing the “case reserved,”
which is the basis for the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, quite
459

Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
461
Id. (“If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal
questions raised by the motion.”).
460
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clearly involved reserved questions of law, or at most mixed questions
of law and fact. Finally, in eighteenth century England, disputed
questions of fact went to the jury. None of these eighteenth century
procedures support the proposition that courts can decide disputed
questions of fact simply because the evidence is extremely one-sided.
Recent Supreme Court cases suggest some retrenchment in the
approach to defining matters as fact or law. As one commentator has
detailed, the Court overturned judgments as a matter of law several
times in the late twentieth century, insisting that the matter was for
462
the jury to decide. These cases include Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
463
Products, Inc., where the Court held that the question whether the
plaintiff’s dismissal from his job was due to age discrimination was a
464
465
question for the jury; Hunt v. Cromartie, where the Court held that
summary judgment was not an appropriate vehicle for determining a
466
state legislature’s motivation in creating congressional districts; and
467
Bragdon v. Abbott, where the Court held that the question whether a
person’s HIV-positive status posed a direct threat to a dentist who had
468
Whether such
refused to treat her was a question for the jury.
decisions restrain the lower courts in their rush to judgments as a
469
matter of law remains to be seen. However, this examination of the
case law reveals that the problem dates back much farther than we
have been willing to acknowledge.
IV. MARKMAN AND HISTORY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Having reviewed the history of the law/fact distinction, it is
appropriate to consider how Markman might affect the jurisprudence
of the law/fact distinction. While Markman may be limited to its
context of patent claim interpretation, the language is broader than
that. This section describes the Markman opinion in more detail and
then analyzes how it might affect the jurisprudence of the law/fact
distinction.

462

See Mollica, supra note 114, at 205-18.
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
464
Id. at 146-48.
465
526 U.S. 541 (1999).
466
Id. at 553.
467
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
468
Id. at 652-55.
469
One commentator has argued that the lower courts have shown considerably
more enthusiasm for taking cases away from the jury than the Supreme Court in
recent decades. See Schnapper, supra note 114. The Supreme Court cannot police
all of the cases where matters are taken out of the hands of the jury, even if it thinks
the lower courts are going too far.
463
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A. The Markman Decision
A claim is the part of a patent that describes the unique features
470
of the invention.
The patent at issue in Markman was for an
471
The
inventory tracking system for dry cleaning establishments.
question was whether a system that tracked accounts receivable but
not articles of clothing infringed Markman’s patent for a system that
472
tracked both.
The jury found an infringement, but the district
court granted the defendant’s deferred motion for judgment as a
473
matter of law. The court’s decision turned on its interpretation of
the claim in Markman’s patent, which the court construed as
474
encompassing both cash inventory and inventory of clothing. The
question on appeal was whether the district court had properly taken
475
this decision out of the hands of the jury.
The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that construction of a claim in a patent is “the
476
exclusive province of the court” and the Supreme Court agreed.
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Souter,
described its task in terms of both the law/equity and law/fact
477
distinctions. As for the law/equity distinction, the Court noted the
historical test and determined quickly and easily that juries were a
478
feature of patent infringement litigation in England in 1791.
The
Court then said that the next question was “whether the particular
trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance
479
of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”
The Court noted
470

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996).
Id. at 374.
472
Id. at 374-75.
473
Id. at 375.
474
See id.
475
Id. at 371.
476
Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
477
Id. at 372-73.
478
Id. at 377. The Court did not spend much time on this issue, perhaps because
it was obvious. Patent infringement cases tended to be brought as actions on the
case, a common law action. See, e.g., Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1787).
The usual test for determining whether a case is subject to the Seventh Amendment
has two parts, with the first being whether the matter would have been tried in a
court of law in England in 1791or whether it was analogous to a legal cause of action.
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
564-65 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). The second part of
the test is whether the remedy is legal or equitable, which the Court has
characterized as the more important of the two inquiries. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565;
see also Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18, 420-21. The Court in Markman never discussed the
remedy, perhaps because the first part of the test provided such a clear answer. The
Court in both Terry and Tull determined that the first part of the test did not
definitively resolve the question, so it had to turn to the second prong of the analysis.
479
Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
471
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that this question had been answered in the past by referring to the
distinction between substance and procedure or between fact and
law, but reasoned that “the sounder course, when available, is to
classify a mongrel practice . . . by using the historical method, much
480
as we do in characterizing the suits and actions in which they arise.”
The Court went on to say that “where there is no exact antecedent,
the best hope lies in comparing the modern practice to earlier ones
481
whose allocation to court or jury we do know.” In other words, the
court finds an analogous issue, and decides whether the analogous
issue was normally decided by the judge or the jury in England in
1791.
The Court then examined eighteenth century English patent
cases, analogizing the modern patent claim to the eighteenth century
482
“specification.” The Court noted that there were few reported cases
dealing with the interpretation of disputed terms in a specification,
but that “none demonstrates that the definition of such a term was
483
determined by the jury.”
The cases reveal that juries regularly
decided whether the patent covered a new invention (novelty) and
whether the invention could be built from the specification in the
484
patent (enablement). Markman had argued that in deciding such
matters, juries must have decided the meaning of disputed terms in
485
the specification.
The Court, however, apparently believed that
courts could, and did, tell the jurors what the disputed terms meant
486
before sending them off to decide novelty or enablement.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied partly on the lack
of a clear statement in the cases that juries were to interpret terms in
the specification, but also on the general rule that judges, and not
juries, interpreted written documents in eighteenth century
487
England. The Court found nothing to suggest that this rule was not
488
followed in patent cases. The Court also rejected Markman’s claim
that juries regularly interpreted terms of art in written documents,
480

Id. at 378.
Id.
482
See id. at 379-80.
483
Id. at 380. In one of the cases cited, however, the judge, Lord Kenyon, told the
jury that the invention was not new, and that they should find for the defendant, but
the report notes that “[t]he jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the verdict was
not afterwards disturbed.” Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. Pat. Cas. 168, 171-72 (K.B.
1789).
484
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 379-83.
485
Id. at 381.
486
See id. at 382.
487
Id. at 381-82.
488
Id. at 381-83.
481
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finding no evidence from late eighteenth century England suggesting
489
that juries interpreted terms of art in patent cases.
Finding no evidence that juries interpreted patent specifications
at common law, the Court then determined that it must “look
elsewhere to characterize this determination of meaning in order to
490
allocate it as between court or jury.” The Court noted that it should
“accordingly consult existing precedent and consider both the
relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory
491
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.”
In other
words, the Court looked to both U.S. precedent and policy to
determine if the eighteenth century rule should be altered so as to
allow a jury to interpret patent claims. This suggests that the Court
was willing to permit a jury to interpret patent claims based on
precedent or policy. However, the Court ultimately found that
492
neither factor supported that result.
Whether or not the Court had taken this historical approach
493
before, it is a new way of describing how courts draw what is
commonly called the law/fact distinction. Indeed, the Court seemed
to treat the law/fact distinction as simply one way of defining the
489

Id. at 383-84.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
491
Id. at 384.
492
The Court found that the precedent distinguished between the written patent
and the actual invention, and gave to the jury questions about the “‘character of the
thing invented.’” Id. at 386 (quoting Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 816
(1869)). The Court also found that nineteenth century commentators generally
noted that claim construction was for the court. Id. at 387-88. Finally, as to matters
of policy, the Court found that both the judges’ “special training in exegesis,” id. at
388, and the need for uniformity in patent construction meant that claim
construction should be given to the judge. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91.
493
In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court first determined that the
claim for a civil penalty under the Clean Water Act was analogous to a legal action,
and so required a jury, see id. at 417-25, and then turned to the question whether a
jury was required to assess the amount of a civil penalty. See id. at 425-27. In
answering the second question, the Court noted that Congress could itself determine
the amount of a civil penalty, and described a similar power in Parliament during the
eighteenth century. Id. (citing Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1147-49 (K.B.
1775)); see also id. at 426. Because the amount of the civil penalty could be
determined by the legislature, the Court concluded, the “substance of a common-law
right to a trial by jury” does not include the determination of the amount of a civil
penalty. Id. Thus, as in Markman, the Court in Tull attempted to define the
“substance of a common-law right” to a jury trial by looking at history, though the
examination of history in Tull was not as sweeping as it was in Markman. This would
not be the first time that the Court hinted at an approach in one case and made the
approach more explicit in a later case. For example, the Court’s two-step approach
to defining the distinction between law and equity for purposes of the Seventh
Amendment was hinted at in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), but did not
become explicit until thirteen years later with the decision in Tull.
490
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substance of the common law right to a jury trial. The Court
reasoned that the best way to define the substance of the right is
through history. That analysis raises interesting questions about the
use of the reasonable jury standard, directed verdict, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and summary judgment.
B. The Future of the Law/Fact Distinction
Markman calls into question all of the development described in
this article. If we are to look to history to define the contours of the
right that is preserved by the Seventh Amendment we will surely have
to backtrack from the conclusions of Munson, Galloway, Redman, and
the trilogy. It is insufficient to quote empty words, or to cite
unexamined cases, as the Court repeatedly did in sanctioning the
expansion of judicial power reflected by these cases. Rather, if we are
to understand the history that the Court now seems prepared to
invoke, we must look at the circumstances behind the words of the
eighteenth century English and early American cases relied on by the
Court. Those circumstances belie the conclusions that the Court has
drawn in Munson, Galloway, Redman, and the trilogy. There was no
reasonable jury standard in eighteenth century English cases. The
demurrer to the evidence was not used to resolve disputed questions
of pure fact, and neither was the case reserved. Judges applied law to
undisputed facts, but if facts were disputed, they sent cases to the jury.
Finally, although early U.S. cases said that courts were not bound by
eighteenth century English procedures, the procedural changes that
the Court had approved prior to Munson and Galloway left factfinding in the jury’s hands.
Of course, this too may paint too simplistic a picture. The
law/fact distinction had its bumps and detours in eighteenth century
England as well. It has never been the case that juries always found
all of the facts; some kinds of facts had to be determined by the
494
judge. An example given by a number of writers is that judges, not
juries, determined whether probable cause for prosecution existed in
495
a suit for malicious prosecution. Of course, one can see some legal
content to such a question, so it might more accurately be deemed a
mixed question of law and fact: probable cause for a criminal
prosecution is tied up with policy decisions that protect both the
494

See THAYER, supra note 3, at 184-85. For discussions of the law/fact distinction,
including the somewhat arbitrary classifications of law and fact employed in
eighteenth century England, see the materials cited supra note 3.
495
See FORSYTH, supra note 3; see also THAYER, supra note 3, at 221-22, 252; GREEN,
supra note 3, at 280.
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accused and the accuser.
Another example of arbitrariness in defining law and fact is the
distinction at issue in Markman: judges, not juries, decided the
meaning of written documents in eighteenth century England, even
if such inquires look like questions of fact. There were complications
to this common law doctrine, however. First, courts sometimes called
upon juries to interpret terms of art in written documents on the
theory that jurors, who were themselves steeped in the useful arts,
would have a better understanding of what those terms meant than
496
the more removed judges. The Court in Markman considered this
complication, but decided that it did not apply in that case because
the earliest patent case cited for the proposition was decided in 1841,
497
well after the ratification of the Seventh Amendment.
Of course, if it was illegitimate to cite an 1841 case to define the
Seventh Amendment in Markman, it was also illegitimate to cite an
1853 case, Jewell v. Parr, for a similar purpose in Munson. Moreover,
Munson, with its reliance on Jewell, is the basis for the decisions in
Galloway, Redman, and the trilogy. If Markman was serious about
relying on history to define the contours of the Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial, then the entire structure must collapse. Even if the
structure still stands, however, my examination of the facts of the
cases that the Court has relied on to define the law/fact distinction
reveals that the structure has serious flaws. The cases simply do not
support the conclusions that the Court reaches.
It might be argued that whatever the legitimacy of relying on an
1853 English case in the first place, the doctrine borrowed from that
case is now too well established to deny. Markman itself suggested
498
that post-1791 U.S. precedent could affect the right to a jury trial.
But, Markman would have used such precedent to allow a jury trial
where history did not demand one. It is quite another matter to
allow such precedent to have continuing force when it becomes clear
that it has failed the Seventh Amendment mandate to “preserve” the
right to a jury trial.

496

See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384. Markman noted that there is some evidence that
this doctrine was in its early development in the late 1700s. See id. at 383-84, n.9
(citing 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2461, at 195
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981)).
497
The Court cited Wigmore on Evidence for the proposition that the allocation to
juries of the interpretation of terms of art in documents generally was not well
established at the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified, but considered it
irrelevant anyway given that Markman was a patent case. Markman, 517 U.S. at 383-84
(citing 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461, at 195).
498
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91.
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The historical approach, however, is not without difficulty. In
fact, the history is sometimes quite murky, as Markman itself
illustrates. Relying on that history would require litigants and judges
to search through old English cases in hopes of gleaning the English
classification of a particular issue. Such research could be difficult to
do, both because those cases are not going to be readily accessible to
many lawyers and judges, and because the cases themselves are
difficult to interpret. Many are written in archaic legal language and
employ archaic common law procedural devices that are not well
known to modern lawyers. Furthermore, the case reports vary
considerably in clarity and completeness. Some are just two or three
sentences, while others go on for pages.
The Court and
commentators have criticized the historical approach to the
499
law/equity distinction, and if anything, the difficulties of doing
historical research would be greater in dealing with the law/fact
distinction. There are also instances where modern juries decide
issues that historically were given to judges in eighteenth century
England, and some question about how to handle such matters would
arise. Again, Markman provides an example. Eighteenth century
English judges interpreted written documents, largely on the theory
that words had immutable legal meanings. We no longer have such
confidence in the clarity of words, and courts instead look to the
intent of the parties as reflected in the document. For the most part,
500
we leave questions of such intent to juries.
In theory, Markman
could return document interpretation to the judge, though that is
one area where post-1791 U.S. precedent might supersede history.
V. CONCLUSION
For well over one hundred years, courts have found procedural
excuses for taking questions of fact away from juries. The courts have
relied on eighteenth century English practice to justify their action,
arguing that modern procedures are mere variations on the English
themes. This whole symphony, however, is built on a theme that does
not exist: the reasonable jury standard was not announced in
England until 1853, well after the relevant date for determining what
the Seventh Amendment preserves. Moreover, a comparison of the
kinds of issues taken from juries in eighteenth century England with
499

See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 574-81 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
Redish, supra note 108 (criticizing the historical approach).
500
See, e.g., Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966); cf.
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (classifying the interpretation of documents as fact-finding for
purposes of establishing the appellate standard of review of fact-finding by judges).
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those taken from the juries under modern American procedures for
defining judgments “as a matter of law” show that they are quite
different. Fact has become law, and as it becomes law, it is withdrawn
from the jury.
Markman suggests that the Supreme Court might be returning to
a more historical view of the Seventh Amendment. Indeed, Markman
explicitly stated that the best method for determining what are the
fundamental elements of the right to jury trial—the elements that are
501
preserved by the Seventh Amendment—is the historical method. If
the Court is serious about defining the right to jury trial historically, it
ought to take a close look at Munson and all the cases that rely upon
it.

501

See Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.

